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ABSTRACT
An important part of our institutional and cultural history is our
understanding of a system ofproperty interests. The most common trajectory of
land-use regulation appears consistent with a property rights meta-narrative
that informs multiple academic disciplines and levels of human interaction.
This meta-narrative suggests that all land-use decisions begin with an
assumption about the nature and extent of property rights held by potentially
affected landowners, and that the ultimate end of any land-use regime is to
"protect" those assumed property rights from unwarranted or unjustified
intrusion by government. Because the law is a distinct linguistic environment
in which word choices, and definitions, have significant consequences, this
assumed rhetorical landscape of a property dispute plays a significant role in
determining the dispute's ultimate outcome. In most land-use disputes, all
participants make one important concession, or assertion, before the discussion
begins. The often unchallenged assertion is the claim that the discussion is in
fact about property rights. Once a particular property interest is characterized
as a "right, " the community's political capacity to regulate that property
interest diminishes substantially. Consequently, our decisions to characterize
as "rights" those settings, circumstances and relationships that are better and
more accurately understood as "privileges" changes our focus from the
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community to the individual, and necessarily weakens the political justification
for, and community understanding of most resource- or community-protective
ordinances. This article considers contemporary property jurisprudence,
theory, and conflict in a Hohfeldian context to demonstrate how our default
rhetorical landscape leads to real and unnecessary negative social and
environmental effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An important part of our institutional and cultural history is our
understanding of a system of property "rights." The most common trajectory
of land-use regulation (or the lack thereof) follows a property rights meta-
narrative that informs multiple academic disciplines and levels of human
interaction. This meta-narrative suggests that all land-use decisions begin with
an assumption about the nature and extent of property rights held by potentially
affected landowners, and that the ultimate end of any land-use regime is to
"protect" those assumed property rights from unwarranted or unjustified
intrusion by government or neighboring landowners. Or at least to regulate
land in a way that causes the least harm to those assumed rights.
While this meta-narrative provides some useful information, it suffers from
(or more accurately, benefits from) an intentional carelessness regarding its
most crucial term. Perhaps more than in any other epistemic community,
language matters in the law. Even at its most generic, the law is a distinct
linguistic environment in which word choices, and definitions, have significant
[Vol. 48:2
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consequences. In this specific context, all participants in the discussion make
one important assertion, or concession, before the discussion begins. And that
assertion largely predetermines the discussion's outcome. The assertion is the
claim that the discussion is about property rights.
The word "right" has--or at least could have-a distinct meaning in the
law. But at that initial conflict when adjoining property owners first go about
negotiating their interactions, most of the circumstances that we consider
property rights are not in fact rights as the law understands them. Rather, at
that first conflict, most alleged property rights are better understood as property
privileges.' This distinction is important. Our decisions to characterize as
rights those settings, circumstances, and relationships that are better and more
accurately understood as privileges changes our focus from the community to
the individual. This necessarily weakens the political justification for, and
community understanding of, most resource or community-protective
ordinances.
This article argues that we misuse legal terms of art in a fashion that causes
negative changes to the landscape and the communities that emerge around
given landscapes. 2 Proponents of legitimate, and arguably necessary, land-use
or environmental regulation facilitate these negative outcomes by conceding
the rhetorical playing field to anti-regulatory advocates. The rhetorical and
political landscape resulting from this concession creates a gap between a local
government's potential constitutional authority and its actual political
authority-that is, rhetorical choices create political conditions that prevent
state and local governments from exercising the full range of regulatory
authority and options available to them.
1. I may be running against the grain a bit in my insistence on using the word
"privileges" rather than "liberties" to describe the property interests at issue. But given the
nature of this argument, my fear is that replacing "rights" with "liberties" does not get me
where I want to go. So I'll use privileges even if I'm alone in doing so. See J.E. Penner,
Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property, in PROPERTY PROBLEMS FROM GENES TO PENSION FUNDS
165 n.7 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997) ("The term Hohfeld uses is 'privileges,' but no one else does,
and for all intents and purposes he means 'liberties."').
2. In some ways, this work is an extension of recent empirical work performed by
Professors Jonathan Remy Nash and Stephanie M. Stem regarding the effect of different
property "frames." Although, as will be clear throughout this article, I think Professors Nash
and Stern would have benefitted from a Hohfeldian conception of their property frames. See
Jonathan R. Nash & Stephanie M. Stem, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 449, 453
(2010); see also Jonathan R. Nash, Packaging Property: The Effect of Paradigmatic
Framing of Property Rights, 83 TUL. L. REV. 691, 693 (2009).
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Failing to recognize that property consists of both rights and privileges,
3
and focusing on property exclusively as a set of rights, allows property to exist
as a setting or circumstance unique and singular to each individual. Property
becomes less of a mutually-beneficial agreement between the individual and his
or her community and more of a bulwark against that community. This
singular understanding of property precludes considering property as part of a
broader institutional, cultural, or community arrangement.4 And that failure
potentially transforms an otherwise rational balancing of various individual and
community interests into the "taking" of private property that the local
government cannot justify. But often the taking is not a constitutional taking;
rather, it is merely a context-specific political taking.
So when the discussion about proposed land-use regulation becomes a
dispute over "property rights," anti-regulation, or anti-communitarian, activists
have already largely won the battle. More troublesome, those activists enjoy
considerable assistance from their opponents in framing the issue in this
fashion. Courts, academics, environmentalists, community interest groups, and
others all concede this characterization, giving up an important rhetorical and
legal tool.
To be clear, this argument that particular property interests are
inappropriately classified as "property rights" is not an argument that the
fundamental property interest at issue is inappropriate-too large or too
"absolute." The basic nature, justification, and purpose of the property interest
does not change, only the rhetorical landscape in which we consider the
property interest. An accurate rhetorical rendering of the property interest is
relevant, and important, because it allows for a better individual and
community understanding of both the costs and benefits of the proposed, or
final, institutional arrangement. An accurate rhetorical landscape does not
3. Property interests might also be characterized as including powers and
immunities, but I set aside those interests for the moment to focus on property privileges.
4. This article fits within a larger set of works arguing for a more complete
discussion of the range of effects property-allocation decisions have on both communities
and the landscape. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand The Evolution of
Property Law, Culture, and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 214
(2011); Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 281 (2002) [hereinafter "Reconstitution"]; John
Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological Nuisances to
Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787, 788 (2007); David B. Hunter, An
Ecological Perspective on Property: A Callfor Judicial Protection of the Public 's Interest in
Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 311 (1988); Joseph L.
Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (1993); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE
SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 3 (2003).
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leave us with less property. It leaves us with better property. Consequently, it
leaves us with better communities and landscapes.
This article begins by considering how the American public understands
and uses its rights rhetoric in a property context. My goal is not to recreate the
significant but somewhat more general work already completed on this
subject,5 but rather to create a context for the section that follows: the
reintroduction of an understanding of property first proposed in 1913 by
Professor Wesley Hohfeld.6 Although Hohfeld's approach is both simple and
useful-and inspired the first five sections of the Restatement (First) of
Property-courts, academics, and activists have chosen not to take advantage
of the rhetorical tools it provides. Following the reintroduction of Hohfeld, I
present examples of how courts, academics, and activists fall prey to the same
misuse of a property-rights rhetoric. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Stop the Beach Renourishment Incorporated v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection7 illustrates how a Hohfeldian approach might have
facilitated better understanding of the dispute and its resolution. My argument
is not that Hohfeld presents the best possible, or even best currently available,
approach to understanding property. 8  Rather, my claim is simply that
recognizing the distinction between rights and privileges-and then using it-
provides for a better discourse about how a community might use, protect, or
restrict potential interests in land.
II. LAND AND RIGHTS IN AMERICAN CULTURAL DISCOURSE
[I]n its simple American form, the language of rights is the language of no
compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has to get out of town. The
conversation is over.
9
Because this article argues that the claim of "property rights" is significant,
and often outcome determinative, we must begin with a brief discussion of how
5. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
6. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16, 17 n.4 (1913).
7. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
8. There are a number of significant and reasonable criticisms of Hohfeld's
approach. See, e.g., A.M. Honor6, Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting, 34
TUL. L. REV. 453, 453 (1960); James E. Penner, The "'Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property,
43 UCLA L. REV. 711,712 (1995); Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 282, 287-88.
9. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 9.
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we-as a social and cultural organization-understand the phrase "property
rights" and why its use is worth reconsidering.
10
One of the potentially more troubling legal concepts awaiting a new law
student is also one of the most fundamental. From the first day of the IL
Property class, emerging legal scholars are informed that property is not a
thing, but rather a constellation of relationships about a thing.1' More
important, and perhaps more troubling, we teach immediately that there is
nothing inherent in land that we can identify as constituting "property" as a
cultural and legal concept. There is no a priori eternal truth about property or
its nature, no ideal that might be identified and then pursued. As Justice
Marshall provided in Johnson v. M'Intosh, the first property case experienced
by many law students: "[a]s the right of society, to prescribe those rules by
which property may be acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into
question; as the title to lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend
entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie[.],, 12 While this statement
presupposes "property," it is consistent with the notion that property must
emerge from the ongoing disputes, community conversations, and temporary
resolutions that we call law.
This understanding of property as a set of relationships about a particular
piece of land, for example, rather than the land itself, is neither new nor
controversial within the legal community, even if it might be controversial
culturally. When tasked with determining whether trade secrets were property
interests recognized by the 5th Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company:
It is conceivable that [the term "property" in the Taking Clause] was
used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with
respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the
other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to
denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
10. For a much more thorough discussion of the role of a rights rhetoric and
American political and cultural discourse, see generally id.
11. Professor Arnold has argued that we focus too much on the relationship and not
enough on the "thing." I'll address Professor Arnold's approach briefly in Section V,
although it is worth acknowledging here that his fundamental critique is useful. See
Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 281-83; see also Penner, supra note 8, at 712-13.
12. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572 (1823) (Johnson v. McIntosh is the first
case in Dukeminier, et al.'s popular Property casebook).
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physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of
fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter.
13
This characterization of how the law understands "property" is also
reflected in the Restatement (First) of Property, first published in 1936.4 The
introductory note to Chapter 1- "Definition of Certain General Terms"-
provides:
The word "property" is used sometimes to denote the thing with
respect to which legal relations between persons exist and sometimes
to denote the legal relations. The former of these two usages is
illustrated in the expressions "the property abuts on the highway" and
"the property was destroyed by fire." This usage does not occur in this
Restatement. When it is desired to indicate the thing with regard to
which legal relations exist, it will be referred to either specifically as
"the land," "the automobile," "the share of stock," or, generically, as
"the subject matter of property" or "the thing. 15
Unfortunately, this understanding makes less sense to the mass of
landowners and decision makers that influence and create land-use regulation.
While lawyers and legal academics are relatively comfortable distinguishing
between res 16 and relationships, for the general public, the res-the land
itself-matters more than the relationships it inspires.17
From a simplified perspective, property disputes might be broadly
characterized as addressing one of two issues: who owns the thing, and what
does that ownership mean?' 8 The IL property class is likely the first place
13. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (quoting United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1945)).
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY (1936).
15. Id. at3.
16. Res is used here to represent the physical object of the property relationship. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1420 (9th ed. 2009).
17. "Do you stand there, Scarlett O'Hara, and tell me that Tara - that land - doesn't
amount to anything?"
Scarlett nodded obstinately. Her heart was too sore to care whether or not
she put her father in a temper.
"Land is the only thing in the world that amounts to anything," he shouted,
his thick, short arms making wide gestures of indignation, "for 'tis the only thing
in this world that lasts, and don't you be forgetting it! 'Tis the only thing worth
working for, worth fighting for-worth dying for."
MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 55 (60th Anniversary Ed, Scribner Publ. 1996)
(1964).
18. Carruthers and Ariovich identify five distinct dimensions of property, of which
I've only explicitly mentioned two. However, the other three are implicit in the two primary
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many people think carefully about the second question-to that point, what
ownership means seems obvious. This distinction is not perfect, of course, as
answering the "who" question requires the antecedent answer to "what" the
thing is to be owned. And the "what" answer necessarily requires
consideration of the relationship of the potential owner, whoever that may be,
to other potential owners, or to the potential owners' neighbors. The Coasean
parable occurs at the intersection of these questions.' 9 The farmer and rancher
in Coase's tale do not dispute the appropriate boundary between their parcels,
but rather dispute the meaning of that boundary. 2 The "who" and "what"
questions become somewhat more complicated when we realize that it is some
element of the relationship between the parcels that must be identified and
allocated. The answers to these questions are reciprocally constituted. In the
Coasean conflict, we only have a "what" and subsequent "who" problem
because of the particular "whos" involved in the conflict. The conflict does not
occur, at least not in this fashion, if both landowners are farmers without cattle
21that might stray.
dimensions identified here. Those five dimensions are: the objects of property (what can be
owned), the subjects of property (who can own), the uses of property, the enforcement of
rights, and the transfer of property. Bruce G. Carruthers & Laura Ariovich, The Sociology of
Property Rights, 30 ANN. REV. Soc. 23, 24-30 (2004).
19. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1960).
Coase described a situation in which a cattle rancher owns land next to a farmer. Id. Without
a fence, the cows wander across the property boundary and cause harm to the crops; each
additional cow causes more harm than the previously-added cow (i.e., the marginal cost
increases with each cow added). Id. At some point, the harm caused by a new cow is greater
than the benefit to be gained by adding the cow. Id. Additionally, at some point, the
cumulative harm caused by the cows exceeds the cost of building a fence between the
parcels. See id. For the purposes of this article, the interesting component of this story is the
question of who should be responsible for building the fence between the parcels-i.e., does
the rancher have the privilege of letting his cows wander (and the farmer no right to remain
unmolested by wandering cows), or does the farmer have a right to remain unmolested by
wandering cows (and the rancher a duty to control his cows). Note this does not address the
question of the farmer's right to exclude the cows by building the fence, which is assumed.
20. See id
21. In an age of genetically modified organisms, plants can also stray in a manner
that has negative effects on other plants. Cross-pollination by genetically modified plants-
or "pollen-mediated gene flow" -provides an excellent contemporary example of the
"problem" in The Problem of Social Cost. See generally Katie Eastham & Jeremy Sweet,
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): The Significance of Gene Flow Through Pollen
Transfer, European Environment Agency, Environmental Issue Report, No. 28 (2002),
available at http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-bn/eua/02/28.pdf; see also Paul J.
Heald & James C. Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in A Genetically Modified Age, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 87, 87-88 (2006).
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But those are the conceptual realities and difficulties of a law professor, not
a first-year law student, much less a typical landowner. Although for our
simpler purposes, identifying these two distinct questions does provide a few
benefits. First, the "who" and "what" understanding of property is consistent
with how the law treats property questions. Returning to the popular
Dukeminier casebook, we find the first two chapters dedicated to the idea that
property can be "acquired., 22  In articulating the sets of rules-and
justifications for those rules-that apply to found property, gifted property,
trespass (adverse possession), etc., the law is focusing on answering the "who"
question and leaving the "what" for later (albeit sometimes within the same
dispute). The 5th Amendment "takings" jurisprudence also recognizes this
distinction. The Supreme Court recognizes two basic categories of takings:
"classic" takings and regulatory takings. 23 Classic takings involve the actual,
physical appropriation of land. For example, taking land from one owner and
conveying it directly and completely to the public for a public use, such as a
24road, school, park, or some other similar use. To the extent the everyday
application of these cases is controversial, the controversies revolve around the
relatively simple questions of what actually has been taken, and the value of
that thing taken.25 In both cases, the primary focus is on defining the physical
boundaries of the "thing."
22. Chapters 1 and 2 of the Dukeminier casebook are titled "First Possession:
Acquisition of Property by Discovery, Capture, and Creation," and "Subsequent Possession:
Acquisition of Property by Find, Adverse Possession, and Gift." JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL.,
PROPERTY, Ch. 1-2 (6th ed. 2006).
23. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
24. The takings clause of 5th Amendment is perhaps best understood as creating a
limitation on a pre-existing power of government. That pre-existing power is the ability to
take private property for a public use. The limitation is that when private property is taken
for a public use, the government must provide just compensation. As Justice O'Conner
noted in Hawai'i Housing Authority v. Midkiff. "The 'public use' requirement is thus
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). This
is something of a doubled-edged sword, however. While an expansive definition of "public
use" allows government to take private lands for activities that do not contemplate actual use
by the public, see, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005), it
also arguably expands the reach of the regulatory takings doctrine to land-use regulation that
is not the equivalent of "use by the public." In other words, the government's ability to take
is larger than a strict "use by the public" standard would allow, but its ability to regulate
without compensation is also potentially restricted. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER &
THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 397
(2003).
25. See generally Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 154 P.3d 802, 804, 806, 808 (Utah
2007) (determining whether in exercising eminent domain, the Utah DOT must pay for the
value associated with visibility from a highway (no) and the value associated with the view
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In contrast, regulatory takings cases do not transfer property from one
owner to another as transfer is commonly understood. In other words,
regulatory takings cases do not change the "who." Rather, a regulatory takings
case-particularly a case that does not rise to a level sufficient to be
characterized as a takings-adjusts the "what" that is owned.2 6 The landowner
has not changed, but her relationship with the community has.
But most important, this distinction is also consistent with how we-as a
social community-understand property. More to the point, the distinction
highlights what the public understands, and what it chooses to ignore, about
property. People care primarily about land 7T-particularly, we care about
specific parcels of land that we can call our own. The "right to exclude" is
considered the most important right in the proverbial "bundle of sticks" for a
reason. 28 There is also a reason that of the recent Supreme Court decisions
characterizing the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, Kelo v. City of New
London, Connecticut 9 had a much larger immediate cultural impact than
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,30 even though Citizens United
is arguably more offensive and consequential. 31 Although Kelo had very little
real effect on the existing legal landscape, it appeared to affect the sanctity of
the private home, which has a greater visceral effect-if nothing more-than
some abstract change in the intricacies of campaign finance.
The public's focus on the physical component of property is a durable part
of American Culture. Professor Eric Freyfogle describes our early
understandings of the relationship between land and property:
from the building (depends on if the land condemned was essential to the project that
blocked the view)).
26. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
27. See generally Richard C. Stedman, Is It Really Just a Social Construction?: The
Contribution of the Physical Environment to Sense of Place, 16 Soc. & NAT. RES. 671
(2003).
28. See, e.g., Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Kaiser Aetna v. U. S., 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
29. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
30. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The cultural effect of Citizens United has increased,
particularly during the "Occupy" period and the early stages of the Republican Presidential
Primary. Although unlike Kelo, the public perception of the connection between negative
campaign advertisements (or the "Definitely Not Coordinating with Stephen Colbert Super
Pac") and a Supreme Court decision is much more attenuated.
31. E.g., 2 Am. Law. Zoning § 17:18 (5th ed.) ("[B]y 2008 forty-two states had
adopted some type of legislative response to the Kelo decision."); Sean Flynn, Will the
Government Take Your Home?, PARADE MAG. (Aug. 6, 2006), http://www.parade.com/
articles/editions/2006/edition_08-06-2006/AEminentDomain; Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets




When Americans in the early nineteenth century thought of property at
law they envisioned preeminently the fee simple ownership of an
imaginary land parcel, with distinct boundaries and a physical, albeit
hypothetical, existence. Other forms of ownership existed, but it was
land that supplied the paradigm, a physicalist model that drew
attention to actual boundaries and to the landowner's right to
exclude.
32
It is this physical notion of property that matters most to us, and, to be sure,
has always mattered most to us. From the beginnings of the Anglo-American
system of property relations, we could not understand property without the
physical thing.33 Although we no longer require the literal transfer of a clod of
dirt or other physical representation of the land, on the land, when we transfer
interests in the land, the land itself remains meaningful.34
Our connection to land-and general assumption that land and property are
synonymous-presents some difficulty in achieving a sophisticated
understanding of the word "right" as it relates to property. As I suggest above,
property disputes can be loosely characterized as answering one of two
questions: "who owns the land?" and "what does that ownership mean?" But
entering 1L students and the general public largely already understand the
answer to the second question. Ownership of land means the ability-that is,
the "right" in the typical parlance-to do whatever one chooses with his or her
land.35 For the general public, there are not two distinct "who" and "what"
questions. Or if there are, the "what" question is readily answered.
Our understanding of the source of those individual perspectives of
property is facilitated by considering both historical ideas and contemporary
events, with the contemporary events demonstrating the significance of the
historical idea in the American experience. In 1651, Thomas Hobbes published
Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth
32. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV.
77, 97-98 (1995); see also Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 20 (2009) ("Boundaries were important .... ").
33. There is a brief discussion of the importance of "livery of seisin" in JESSE
DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 205 (6th 2006); see also Percy Bordwell, Seisin and
Disseisin, 34 HARV. L. REv. 592, 592 (1921).
34. See generally Stedman, supra note 27; Julie K. Clark & Taylor V. Stein,
Incorporating the Natural Landscape Within an Assessment of Community Attachment, 49
FOREST SCIENCE 867, 868 (2003).
35. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Property: Correcting the Half-Truths,
59 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3 (2007); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (1813)
("sole and despotic dominion").
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Ecclesiasticall and Civill.36 As cultural participants, we are most familiar with
Leviathan 's description of life in the state of nature before the creation of the
sovereign. In that pre-sovereign life there is "no knowledge of the face of the
earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of
all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 37 That last phrase being, for many of us, the
38limit of our cultural understanding of Hobbes.
But as political participants, we understand Hobbes much more thoroughly,
even if indirectly. Hobbes' description of the "natural condition of mankind"
in the absence of a sovereign was intended to justify the existence of that
sovereign. 39 And not just any sovereign, of course, but the Leviathan-an
absolute sovereign unconstrained by the desires or inputs of its subjects.4 °
Hobbes' Leviathan had twelve "rights," many of which contemporary
41Americans would find spectacularly offensive. Of the more offensive rights,
the following are illustrative. According to Hobbes, after first agreeing to create
the sovereign, its stbjects cannot later change the government by subsequent
42covenants. The sovereign is incapable of breaching the covenant with its
subjects, and thus sovereign power cannot be forfeited.43  Because the
sovereign acts for and as all of its subjects, it cannot therefore harm any of its
subjects-"[f]or he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein
no injury to him by whose authority he acteth[.],' 44 In short, the sovereign's
power is absolute, and the sovereign's subjects possess no rights that might
limit its power.
The influence of these alleged rights of the sovereign on both the political
views of early Americans and much of our contemporary political discourse
should be obvious. The American Constitution, and its Bill of Rights and
subsequent Amendments, were designed specifically to limit the authority and
36. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
37. Id. at 89.
38. We are fond of the phrase. See, e.g., Sally Fallon, Nasty, Brutish and Short?, 29
ECOLOGIST 20 (1999); Victor L. Streib, Law Deanships: Must They Be Nasty, Brutish, and
Short? 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 116 (1994); J. NEIL SCHULMAN, NASTY, BRUTISH AND SHORT
STORIES (1999); see also Popped Culture: The Nasty, Brutish and Short Life of Mario (Aug.
16, 2003), http://culturepopped.blogspot.com/2010/08/nasty-brutish-and-short-life-of-
mario.html.
39. HOBBES, supra note 36, at 117.
40. Id. at 121-28.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 121-22.
43. Id. at 122.
44. HOBBES, supra note 36, at 124.
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capacity of the Leviathan.45 The Constitution creates a government of limited
46and enumerated powers. From this perspective, the purpose of individual
"rights" is to protect against a Leviathan that attempts to exercise authority
beyond those specifically granted in the Constitution.47 In many cases, the
connection between the rights and the Leviathan are obvious. Free speech
rights, including the right to petition the government, prohibitions on
unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibitions on the quartering of troops,
due process guarantees, among others, all mediate this relationship between
governor and governed. For the purposes of this article, the protections of
property in the 5th and 14th Amendments are our primary concern. But even
beyond the confines of this specific article, the protections afforded property
are significant. Indeed, from the perspective of many landowners, "property
rights" serve principally to protect all other asserted rights: "[t]he right of
property... is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this
is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.
4 8
In The Noblest Triumph, 49 Tom Bethell takes this understanding of the
importance of private property one step further. According to Bethell, as the
title of his work suggests, private property is the bedrock on which prosperity
and civilization are grounded: "[w]hen property is privatized, and the rule of
law is established, in such a way that all including the rulers themselves are
subject to the same law, economies will prosper and civilization will
blossom., 50 At times, Bethell's rhetorical engine runs a bit hot. Rather than
identifying the potential benefits of private property, he finds "blessings"
5'
,,52and not simple blessings; but "liberty, justice, peace and prosperity.
45. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 8 (1985) ("Our Constitution rejects this crude Hobbesian conception.").
46. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 237 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro, ed.,
2009) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.").
47. See id
48. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (2d ed. 1998) (quoting ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE
JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH
AMERICA 29 (2d ed. 1775)).
49. TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH
THE AGES (1998).
50. Id. at 3. A criticism of this argument presents itself immediately, as Bethell's
argument appears to rely more on the rule of law than the institution of private property. But
the point here is not to assess the strengths or weaknesses of his argument, but rather to





While Bethell's language might claim too much for the detached,
"objective" academic, it is consistent with the perspective of many landowners.
Over the past few decades, an allegedly grassroots "movement" has emerged,
attempting to focus our understanding of property on this relationship with the
Leviathan. 53 A range of works from multiple disciplines address this modem
private property rights movement. 54 This movement's expressions in public
policy are somewhat complicated, at times focusing more on dissatisfaction
with federal lands management.55 But the fact that a "private" property rights
movement might include private claims to public lands demonstrates the
importance of attachment to particular lands and landscapes.
Dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo further
demonstrates a similar cultural fixation on property "rights." On February 29,
2012, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill titled "The Private
Property Rights Protection Act of 2012. " 56 The bill prohibits states and
political subdivisions of states from exercising eminent domain for economic
development purposes, on pain of being ineligible for federal funding. 5' The
operative provision-Section 2-is titled "Prohibition on Eminent Domain
Abuse by States." The bill also provides a "Sense of Congress" section: "[i]t is
the policy of the United States to encourage, support, and promote the private
ownership of property and to ensure that the constitutional and other legal
rights of private property owners are protected by the Federal Government."
58
But Congress was slow in joining the anti-Kelo bandwagon. According to the
53. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 513, 513 (2005).
54. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND
ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 83 (2007); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to
Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2005);
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 218 (2000); Bethel, supra note 49, at 341; Epstein, supra note
45, at 3; Ely, supra note 48, at 152; HARVEY M. JACOBS, ED., WHO OWNS AMERICA?: SOCIAL
CONFLICT OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 250 (1998); HARVEY M. JACOBS, ED., PRIVATE PROPERTY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 32 (2004).
55. See, e.g., PHILIP D. BRICK & R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, EDS., A WOLF IN THE
GARDEN: THE LAND RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE 161-232
(1996); John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal
Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317, 341-355 (1980-1981); Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the
Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L.
847, 848 (1981-1982); Richard S. Krannich & Michael D. Smith, Local Perceptions of
Public Lands Natural Resource Management in the Rural West: Toward Improved
Understanding of the "Revolt in the West," 11 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 677, 678 (1998).
56. H.R. 1433 112th Cong. (2012).
57. Id at§ 2.
58. Id. at§ 11.
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Castle Coalition, forty-three states have already enacted some form of• • • 59
legislation restricting the exercise of eminent domain.
The "Tea Party Movement" follows a similar pathway, emphasizing the
importance of private property rights above all other potential interests, public
or private. As provided in Article 6 of the Tea Party's "Articles of Freedom":
The United States is the only nation on earth specifically based on the
premise of the right of individuals to own and control private property.
It is the essential ingredient for Freedom and in the ability to build
personal wealth. Private property ownership is the main factor in
creating our national prosperity and it is the root of our individual
Freedom. Ownership of private property is essential to guaranteeing
individual Liberty. Without private property, no other rights are
possible. There can be no freedom of speech, no freedom of mobility,
or no ability to be secure in our persons without the ability to own and
control private property.
60
But more significant, in terms of its potential long-term impact on the
rhetorical landscape of property disputes, the emphasis on absolute rights in
land has also developed in recent political work on the importance of private
property in the fundamental structure and function of government, particularly
its role in ensuring liberty and prosperity to developed and developing
economies. 61 Over the past few decades, a new understanding of the role of the
state emerged that has dramatically influenced governance at all levels.
Governments (and not just the governed) now consider government to be a
market actor that should assess its potential choices based on the marginal
62utility each might provide. This transition to a "neoliberal" government
emphasizes the government's relationship with the private property of its
63citizens. The government's role is to protect that private property and
59. See Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?%20option=com_content&task=view&id=5 10
(last visited November 9, 2012).
60. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 2009, ARTICLES OF FREEDOM art. 6 (2009), available at
http://www.articlesoffreedom.us/ArticlesofFreedom/ReadtheArticlesPDF.aspx.
61. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005); Loic
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY
(2009) (discussing neoliberal ideology and the rhetoric of "insecurity" in the context of
social welfare and crime control policies); Suzan Ilcan, Privatizing Responsibility: Public
Sector Reform Under Neoliberal Government, 46 CAN. REV. Soc. 207, 208-09 (2009); Terris
Milton, The Neoliberal Triad of Anti-Health Reforms: Government Budget Cutting,
Deregulation, and Privatization, 20 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 149, 151-54, 156-57 (1999).
62. See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 61, at 64-65.
63. See id at 2.
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facilitate its use in an unfettered market economy. 64 Orthodox neoclassical
economics becomes the guiding principle in government, and even social and
cultural relationships; the role of the state is to ensure the unfettered function of
private markets:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights,
free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.65
From this perspective, the guiding principle of modem government is the
market economy. 66 Among the core neoliberal principles are the sanctity of
private property and deregulation. 67 A rights rhetoric-from an economic
perspective rather than personal liberty or social betterment perspective-now
pervades even the most basic and fundamental structure of government.
This increasingly uniform understanding of private property-and
particularly, private property as a suite of individual rights-is an integral part
of American culture. In a review of Ely's The Guardian of Every Other Right,
Professor Herman Belz identified a transition that was occurring in historical
68understanding of private property. Property had previously been understood
as but one component of "economic liberty as a legal construct embracing 'the
whole of the citizenry and ... the prosperity of the larger society."' 69 Ely's
work, in contrast, signaled a transition to an intellectual and cultural climate in
which property rights are a form of individual rights that are "essential to
personal and political liberty. 70
What is important about this transition is not its own inherent value-i.e.,
whether it signals a move toward a better community understanding of
property-but rather what it demonstrates about how we understand property.
To the typical cultural participant, a property "right" is not a simple legal
64. Id. at 64-65.
65. See id. at 2.
66. See John Comaroff, The End of Neoliberalism? What is Left of the Left, 637
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL 141, 144-145 (2011).
67. HARVEY, supra note 61, at 2-3; see also DE SOTO, supra note 54 (arguing that the
protection of private property is one of the most important roles of the state).
68. Herman Belz, Property and Liberty Reconsidered, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1015, 1016-
17(1992).
69. Id. at 1015 (quoting Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Constitution,




relationship among multiple potential legal relationships about a particular
thing. Rather, it is the very foundation of liberty and freedom. If a "right" is
the thing-the only thing-that protects us against tyranny and keeps the
Leviathan at bay, the circumstances in which rights can be curtailed are
extremely limited. In that context, the import of conceding the rhetorical
landscape-and accepting that all land-use disputes are about "rights"-is
obvious.
III. RIGHTS VERSUS PRIVILEGES: WAITING FOR HOHFELD
One of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the incisive
statement, and the true solution of legal problems frequently arises
from the express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may be
reduced to "rights" and "duties, "' and that these latter categories are
therefore adequate for the purpose of analyzing even the most complex
legal interests[.]7
1
The core of my argument is that a more accurate description of the
property interests affected by land-use or other regulation will improve the
success rate of natural-, social- or cultural-resource protective initiatives. The
antecedent argument is that there is a more accurate, and thus better, way to
describe those various property interests.
While the exclusive use of the phrase "property rights" to define American
property relationships serves an obvious purpose, as implied in the preceding
section, it is not necessary. Property interests protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments include the property privileges that are the focus of
72this article, as well as powers and immunities. We do not often speak of
those interests in a regulatory takings context, for example, and the elevation of
"rights" in our political and legal discourse has been matched by a denigration
of "privileges." Although the distinction is somewhat less important now,73
throughout the twentieth century, judges regularly distinguished between rights
and privileges in constitutional cases. 74 The issues were distinctly property
71. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16, 28 (1913).
72. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP., § § 1-5 (1936).
73. See Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ("the Court
has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that
once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights").
74. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69
(1982); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). As initially described by Justice Holmes,
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related, answering questions about the types of circumstances that might enjoy
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. But the
Court's decision to reject the right-privilege distinction (and to replace it with
the similar entitlement approach) 75 was not grounded in a more nuanced
understanding of privileges in the property context. Rather, the Court
grounded its rejection of the right-privilege distinction in the developing
"unconstitutional conditions" approach to assessing governmental regulation.76
Rather than characterizing privileges as independent constitutionally-protected
interests, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine reaffirms the idea that
privileges are distinct and lesser interests than "rights." 77 But this distinction
was, and remains, both inappropriate and confusing. The problem is not that
there is no distinction between property rights and property privileges. The
problem is that it is not this distinction.
78
Identifying and understanding the appropriate distinction between rights
and privileges (and the ultimate failure to distinguish between them) is
primarily consequential not from a legal perspective but rather from a political
perspective. Both rights and privileges are property interests potentially,
then on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, "rights" were those things protected by
constitutional guarantees whereas mere privileges were not. For example: "The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892),
abrogated by O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716 (1996) ("The
Court has rejected for decades now the proposition that a public employee has no right to a
government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First Amendment
rights....").
75. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) ("[T]he
Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges'
that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights. The Court has
also made clear that the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. By the same token, the Court has
required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal
constraints imposed by the criminal process.").
76. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963).
77. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) ("Under the well-
settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person to
give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is
taken for a public use in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government
where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property"); Rumsfield v. Forum
for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) ("the government may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom
of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit") (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003).
78. It is worth mentioning again that most property scholars prefer the word
"liberties" to refer to the settings that Hohfeld characterized as "privileges."
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although not necessarily, protected by the guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.79 To say that something is a
"property privilege" rather than a "property right" is not to say that it does not
enjoy the same constitutional protections. But there exists a real, and often
significant, gap between the reach of local governmental authority allowed by
those constitutional provisions and the reach of local governmental authority
allowed by the political conditions of a particular community, culture, or time.
Most local governments refuse to regulate to the extent allowed by the
Constitution, even as they frame those local political limitations as
constitutional limitations. It is within this gap between constitutionally-allowed
regulation and politically-allowed regulation that the distinction between rights
and privileges matters most.
A. Understanding Property Interests
One hundred years ago, Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld first
articulated a more nuanced understanding of competing property interests.
Hohfeld's article-Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning 8°-and its companion article four years later provided an
understanding of property relationships that inspired the principles established
in the first five sections of the Restatement (First) of Property. 82 Professor
83Hohfeld identified four distinct property interests and their correlatives.
Those property interests are: right, privilege, power, and immunity. 84  The
respective correlatives are: duty, no right, liability, and disability. 85 In creating
these distinct legal categories, Hohfeld sought to improve understanding of
legal relationships by clarifying, and more precisely defining, the nature of
those legal relationships:
In this connection the suggestion may be ventured that the usual
discussions of trusts and other jural interests seem inadequate (and at
times misleading) for the very reason that they are not founded on a
sufficiently comprehensive and discriminating analysis of jural
relations in general. Putting the matter in another way, the tendency-
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF PROPERTY, §§ 1-5 (1936).
80. See generally Hohfeld, supra note 6.
81. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 711-12 (1917) [hereinafter Legal Conceptions].
82. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, §§ 1-5 (1936).
83. Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 30.
84. Id.
85. See id; Legal Conceptions, supra note 81, at 710.
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and the fallacy-has been to treat the specific problem as if it were far
less complex than it really is; and this commendable effort to treat as
simple that which is really complex has, it is believed, furnished a
serious obstacle to the clear understanding, the orderly statement, and
the correct solution of legal problems. In short, it is submitted that the
right kind of simplicity can result only from more searching and more
discriminating analysis.
86
Hohfeld's simplest and most important insight is that a legal interest only
makes sense in a relational context. 87 That is to say, because a legal interest
necessarily changes the status of any other person or entity with a potential
interest in the same property, the nature of the legal interest can only be
understood in relation to the situation of all other relevant actors. 88 Following
naturally from that antecedent insight is the understanding that the nature of the
relationships between actors can vary. It is one thing to say "you cannot stop
me from doing X." It is something else to say "you must allow me to do X."
The two sides of this relationship are not always, or even regularly, two
individual persons expressing a claimed interest in the property, nor are there
always only two sides to the relationship. 89 An individual may have a legal
relationship with another individual, demonstrated by a basic contract.9" The
individual may have a legal relationship with a community, for example the
duty not to engage in acts amounting to a public nuisance, in which the
community has a right to be free from the public nuisance. 9' And the
individual may have a legal relationship with the state, as demonstrated by
86. Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 19-20.
87. Id. at 30. Hohfeld was not the first to recognize this, of course. See OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 198 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2009)
(1881) (arguing that rights can only be understood by considering the logically antecedent
duty).
88. See Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 30.
89. This might be inconsistent with Hohfeld's original understanding, but we won't
let that limit us here. See Penner, supra note 1, at 166 ("The genius of Hohfeld's scheme, or
fatal flaw, depending on your perspective, is his disintegrating urge to define each legal
relation in its most sparse possible form. Thus, every legal relation can only exist as
between two individuals.").
90. A contract may consist of a single promise by one person to another, or of mutual
promises by two persons to one another; or there may be, indeed, any number of persons or
any number of promises. One person may make several promises to one person or to several
persons, or several persons may join in making a single promise to one or more persons.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. a (1932).
91. "A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B (1979) (emphasis added).
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certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 92 But it is impossible to conceive of
a legal interest without some type of relationship with another legal actor. In
the absence of community-even a community of two-law is unnecessary,
and the notion of "legal interest" is meaningless.
A legal relationship can be viewed from the perspective of either actor, and
it is for this reason that Hohfeld described legal interests as a series of four
correlatives--each identifying the nature of the legal interest on each side of
the relationship. 93 This understanding of legal relationships is useful for two
reasons. First, it furthers understanding of the overall relationship by
recognizing the condition of both actors. Second, the correlative increases
understanding of the legal interest possessed by each party.
For example, when one actor has a right, the other actor has a duty to do or
not do a given act.94 In a property context, a landowner might have a right to
exclude. All other individuals would have a duty not to trespass. Outside the
property context, 95 one of the most important rights in the American tradition is
the right to "freedom of speech., 96  The First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. 97 The
Supreme Court determined in Gitlow v. New York that this prohibition applies
92. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech .... ) The U.S. Supreme Court regularly characterizes this prohibition on
Congressional action as creating a "right[] to freedom of speech." See, e.g., Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Or perhaps more appropriate for our present
purposes: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend V. This provision creates a duty to provide just compensation whenever
private property is taken for public use. It also recognizes a privilege to take property for
public use whenever just compensation is provided.
93. Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 30, 32-33, 45, 55.
94. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 1 cmt. a, (1936) ("The relation
indicated by the word 'right' may also be stated from the point of view of the person against
whom that right exists. This person has a duty, that is, is under a legally enforceable
obligation to do or not to do an act.").
95. Although not completely: free speech rights affect rights in land in a number of
ways, from adult entertainment to billboards. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance restricting the location of adult
movie theaters); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981)
(upholding the regulation of billboards).
96. Stephen Siegel suggests that First Amendment rights occupy the "preferred
position" in contemporary American understandings of Constitutional values. See Stephen
A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
57 & n.278 (1986). Professor Siegel is not using "privilege" in a Hohfeldian sense in the
argument presented in this article.
97. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
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to state governments as well as Congress. 98  The First and Fourteenth
Amendments create the right to be free from government interference in
participating in certain forms of speech.99 The government has a correlative
duty not to interfere with those forms of speech-i.e., "Congress shall make no
law . . ."00 It is tempting to qualify the government's duty by saying it is
subject to certain exceptions. For example, the First Amendment's protections
do not apply to "fighting words"'' 01 or advocating imminent forceful action
against the government. 102 "The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.
'' 03
But these are not "exceptions" to the government's duty not to interfere with
speech; they are areas in which the First Amendment does not extend the duty,
and consequently there is no correlative right to engage in those forms of
speech. In other words, there is just the right, as articulated by the Supreme
Court, and talk of "exceptions" to that right is somewhat nonsensical: "[y]our
right to swing your arms ends just where the other man's nose begins."',0 4 The
other man's nose is not an "exception" to the right; it is beyond the right.
Given its nature as limitation on the authority of government, the
Constitution does not create an absolute right to be free from interference from
other private actors, and in some cases, those private actors have the capacity to
interfere directly with speech. 105 In my hometown, as in many similar towns
across the country, a group of individuals gathers regularly in the town square
to protest American involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan (and more
recently to support the Tea Party or Occupy movements). This is precisely the
type of behavior, in precisely the type of location, that the authors of the First
98. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("For present purposes we may
and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press - which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.").
99. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. Id.
101. Chaplinsky v. N. H., 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
102. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 496, 516-17 (1951).
103. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
104. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932,
957 (1919). Of course, Chafee should have said, "Your privilege to swing your arm ......
105. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (recognizing that private
actors "enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints").
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Amendment sought to protect.' °6 The government has a duty not to interfere
with this speech, and the speakers have a right to be free from government
interference. 107
But what about other private actors? With respect to their fellow citizens,
these public speakers are exercising a privilege without any corresponding duty
on the part of passersby to allow the behavior. Those passersby have no duty to
allow or protect the speech but also have no right to prevent it. They can try to
drown it out by engaging in similar speech but have no other mechanism to
affect the speech in any fashion short of refusing to listen. 08 To the extent that
the passersby have a duty at all, it is to avoid battering the speakers (i.e.,
physically forcing them to alter their behavior). But that duty is wholly
unrelated to the speech itself. In that case, the correlative right is not the right
to freedom of speech, but the right to be free from unwanted touching. The
"right" guaranteed by the Constitution only affects the speaker's relationship
with the government; it does not affect the speaker's relationship with other
private actors.'
1 09
Under certain circumstances, boundaries do limit the privilege to criticize.
Freedom of speech is not limitless. There is a point at which the speaker's
privilege to criticize stops and a duty begins-the duty not to make defamatory
assertions about another person. 10 Where society has created those duties, the
subject of the criticism has a correlative right to be free from defamatory
106. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.").
107. Governments are allowed to impose reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on the exercise of free speech rights in public forums. See Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. Ctr. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) ("Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum the
government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions "are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.").
108. While reasonable time, place and manner restrictions might affect the capacity to
engage in "competing speech," those limitations are not Constitutional duties. Rather, the
duty created is the duty to comply with legitimate local law, independent of its relationship
to speech.
109. This point is a bit more obvious in other areas, e.g., the ability of private
universities to constrain speech. See Kelly Sarabyn, Free Speech at Private Universities, 39
J.L. & EDUC. 145, 145, 181 (2010).
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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assertions. Even here, again, we find that the "right" created is not unlimited,
as the duty to avoid defamatory assertions itself is not unlimited: "[o]ne who
publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for
defamation if the statement is true.""' A speaker has the privilege of speaking
the truth, and the object of the speech has no right to prevent it, no matter how
defamatory it might be.1
1 2
B. Rights and Privileges on the Ground
Returning to the example that is the focus of this article, it is similarly
common to describe all of our interactions about land as concerning property
rights. Of course, property rights in land exist in many circumstances, with
both the government and other private actors having correlative duties. But it is
also possible for land-use privileges to exist without rights "protecting" the
same activity, and this is precisely the situation that is the primary focus of this
article. In at least two situations, it is appropriate to think of land-use privileges
rather than land-use rights: where a government actor refuses to act (e.g., by
declining to find a duty in a nuisance case), and, more important, where the
government actor has simply not acted yet. Many land uses remain untouched
by regulation of any sort. Put another way, a community has yet to opine on
the validity of the use, or has perhaps implicitly acknowledged that the
particular use is occurring, but has not indicated whether it is allowed,
supported, or potentially permanent. Both situations-governmental refusal
and failure to act--overlap in significant ways, and both cases, depending on
the context and specific relationships, might suggest that property rights, rather
than privileges, exist. But the distinction is useful for explaining the broader
thesis: we use "rights" in many circumstances when "privileges" would be
more useful and appropriate. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued that
the existence of a duty is "logically antecedent" to the existence of a right."
13
The same concept applies for property privileges: we can only understand the
property interest claimed by first considering the legal position of the
individual (or community) on the other side of the relationship.
The idea that a property right can exist in isolation, separate from the
community or constellation of relationships within which it is embedded, is
111. Id. at § 581A (emphasis added).
112. Of course, the privilege to speak the truth is itself bounded by a limited right to
privacy. As articulated in id. at § 652D: "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."
113. HOLMES, supra note 87, at 198.
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contrary to basic legal and practical understandings of property. As Holmes
recognized, absent a legal duty to act or not act, there can be no correlative
legal right. 114 The addition of the qualifier "legal" -implied so far in this
article-completes our understanding of the right-duty correlative. A duty that
is enforceable-i.e., "legal"-within a given institutional arrangement does not
emerge spontaneously. To the contrary, those duties must be created, or
recognized, by specific acts. The act can be legislative, judicial, or a
combination of the two. But the creation of a duty necessarily requires a
determination regarding the appropriate allocation of various income streams
between individuals or between an individual and a community (or group of
individuals). Consequently, that allocation must be the product of a conscious
act if it is to achieve and retain any legitimacy among the affected persons.
There must be an explanation for the conditions and relationships that emerge
(or persist), and where explanations address human relationships, they can only
follow a specific and identifiable choice. Even when the explanation relies on
theories of natural rights, or "that's how it's always been," there must be the
antecedent choice to believe in that particular explanation in the face of
multiple competing explanations. But again, when focusing on the "legal"
descriptor, we recognize that the choice can be identified as a specific
legislative act or judicial decision creating the duty and the subsequent,
correlative right.
Absent that specific legislative or judicial act creating a duty, the claim that
a "right" exists is only an argument that a duty should exist which might allow
or protect a specific type of behavior on the part of the "right" holder. This is
something of an inverse argument in Peircean Pragmatism, in which a potential
outcome is characterized as having already occurred in order to justify the
specific choice that would ultimately give rise to that outcome. 115 In this
understanding, the purpose of arguing that a right exists is to create a set of
political circumstances that allows the choice to create the right in the first
place. This is, perhaps, a useful rhetorical approach for the rights proposer, but
it is misleading. Such an approach necessarily assumes that a choice has
already been made, and consequently, that there remains no choice to make.
This beguilingly obvious point is important because a choice does remain, and
that choice is to deprive other landowners and the community of their own
potential rights and currently-exercised privileges. To the extent that privileges
exist, they are legitimate property interests that would be taken (albeit not
114. See id.
115. As interpreted and popularized by William James, Peirce's pragmatic method
involves an inquiry into the conceivable consequences of alternative choices. We identify
the better choice by identifying better potential outcome. See William James, What
Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM: A READER, 93, 94-95 (Louis Menand ed., 1997).
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necessarily in the Fifth Amendment context, although that is possible) by the
choice to accept the created imaginings proffered by the beneficiary of the right
to be created.
More important, this inverse pragmatic approach-attempting to justify
future choices based on potential outcomes that are alleged to already exist-is
inconsistent with the American legal tradition's well-established and accepted
understanding of property."l 6 The focus on "rights" that allegedly already exist
converts property from a triadic constellation of thing and relationships to a
dyadic relationship between the individual and "her" property (as she
understands that term). But our legal tradition understands "property" as a
specific set of "legal relations between persons with respect to a thing."' 17 It is
not the individual's relationship with the thing, nor is it a concept inherent in
the thing itself l 8 But when a person argues that "I have a right which you
can't take," that argument fails to recognize the effect that choice has on the
person to whom the new duty will now apply; a person that also might have an
equally legitimate story to tell about property "rights."
Consider a situation in which a community has not yet acted regarding
potentially competing property interests. In this circumstance, an individual
landowner might be using the land in a particular fashion, and the community
has yet to decide how to address the use and its effects on neighboring
landowners or the community at large. Nothing prevents the acting landowner
from using her land as she desires. But that is because the community has yet
to decide whether it desires to prohibit the use, not because the community has
assigned a "right" to the landowner that is correlated with a duty on the part of
the community not to interfere with the activity, even if the duty might
ultimately arise due to detrimental reliance, or the passage of time, for
example.'1 9 Even then, the right does not, and cannot, exist until the
community attempts to interfere with the activity and the landowner succeeds
in convincing the relevant decision maker (e.g., local government or state or
federal court) that the community has a duty to allow the use, thus creating a
right in the landowner.
From the perspective of the community, or the neighboring landowners,
this choice to recognize a duty where no duty previously existed has the
116. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, intro, note (1936).
117. Id.
118. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
119. Perhaps the simplest analogy here, even if imperfect, is to servitudes created by
estoppel. When the use first begins, the owner of what will become the servient estate has
the legal capacity to stop the use. But over time, and with detrimental reliance, that right to
stop the use (and the correlative duty not to trespass) turns into a duty not to stop the use. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.10 (2000).
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necessary consequence of eliminating a potential right in the community. For
example, the legally-unexamined potential "nuisance"-i.e., a situation where
one landowner's use of her land affects a neighboring landowner in some
negative way-is best thought of initially as a privilege and lack of right rather
than as a right and a duty. The affected landowner might think he or she has a
"right" to be free from the alleged nuisance, and that the neighbor has a duty
not to create the negative effect, but until a qualified decision-maker so decides,
we are left with an inactive legal system and the ongoing privilege (or better
said, hope for a privilege). But at the moment the decision-maker determines
how to assign the interests in the dispute, one of the parties loses a potential
property interest. Either the "polluter" loses the privilege to pollute free of
interference from his or her neighbor, or the neighbor loses the potential right
to exist free of his or her neighbor's pollution. Up to this point, there can exist
no rights to use land in a particular way.
It is tempting to characterize a legal decision that a suffering neighbor has
no right to stop pollution as creating a right on the part of the polluter to
continue polluting. This is, in fact, how we normally characterize this
circumstance. 12  Conceptually, this is both unnecessary and inaccurate. As
Holmes suggests, rights only exist where we have identified an antecedent duty
that affirmatively prohibits or specifies particular legal behaviors of another
actor. 12 1 Finding "no right" might give rise to a duty. A duty is a "legally
enforceable obligation to do or not do a given act.''122 The alleged duty in this
example would be the duty not to interfere with the pollution-causing activity,
leading to a correlative right to engage in the pollution-causing activity. This is
conceptually troubling. The polluter has no capacity to call upon the coercive
power of the state to force the neighbor to allow the harmful activity, and it is
not clear how that could happen. If the neighbor were trespassing and
interfering in the polluting activity, the right at issue would be the right to
exclude, rather than the right to pollute. This is a right the polluter already
possessed, prior to the dispute regarding the pollution. 123 The polluter cannot
call the sheriff to force the neighbor to breathe the dirty air or drink the dirty
water. But if the initial decision is that the polluter cannot pollute, the
120. See, e.g., DANIEL W. BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM
AND THE MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 53 (2006) (describing a privilege as existing
in a circumstance of"no law" with some subsequent legal act converting the privilege into a
right).
121. See HOLMES, supra note 87, at 198.
122. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OFPROPERTY, § 1, cmt. a. (1936).
123. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) ("[T]he owner has
somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property-the right to exclude others.").
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determination is that the neighbor has a right to be free from the pollution, and
the polluter thus has the duty not to pollute. In contrast to the opposite
outcome, the neighbor can now call upon the coercive power of the state to
force the polluter to stop the harmful activity.
What this means is that there can never be a "right" to pollute-or even to
use land-in the same way there might be a right to exclude (with a correlative
duty not to trespass) or a right to access (with a correlative duty not to block an
easement). This, however, does not mean that the privilege to pollute is not a
constitutionally-protected property interest, at least potentially. For example,
the ability to construct a home on a particular parcel of land is a property
privilege. The local government, through its exercise of the police power,
might have created a related duty to issue a building permit (assuming certain
requirements are met),124 but that is a tangential correlative interest, not
inherently a part of the fundamental property privilege at issue. The
government does not have a duty to allow the basic use of the land-to build a
house, in this case-but rather lacks the legal right to stop the use, short of
using its eminent domain power and buying the right to stop the use. So if the
relevant government actor determines that the "pollution," or other community
harm, caused by constructing the home is too great, it might decide to take
away the privilege to construct. 15 If it takes away all of the use privileges
associated with a particular parcel of land, that act might require compensation
under the Fifth Amendment's takings clause.126 The privilege to use the land
remains a privilege, but it enjoys the same constitutional protections as any
other property interest.
124. Zoning ordinances generally identify "permitted uses" that will always be
approved so long as the landowner satisfies whatever legitimate requirements are imposed
on the particular use proposed (e.g., lot-line and road setbacks, height restrictions, building
codes, etc.). See, e.g., Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 24, § 4.2(B), at 71-72. To the
extent these regimes create any duties on the local government's part, those duties are to
abide by the ordinances as then in effect. Those requirements can and do change without
changing any of the property rights of the affected landowners. See, e.g., Hale v. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals for Town of Blacksburg, 673 S.E.2d 170, 180 (Va. 2009) ("[W]hen a
landowner has only a future expectation that he will be allowed to develop his property in
accord with its current classification under the local zoning ordinance, there is no vested
property right in the continuation of the land's existing zoning status").
125. Short of a complete taking of all beneficial uses of property, determining whether
a Fifth Amendment taking has occurred requires consideration of the factors articulated in
Pennsylvania Central Transportation. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
126. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992) (finding that a
taking had occurred where the landowner lost all economically beneficial use of his land due
to a building setback requirement. The goals of the coastal zone protection regime were




C. Property Interests as a Matter of Scale
The purpose of the rights-privileges distinction is not that it necessarily
leads to different legal or constitutional outcomes. It is largely a distinction to
be used for its rhetorical effect as we engage in community discussions about
how we should or should not regulate land. The reason the distinction has
some rhetorical, if not legal, effect, is a function of scale: understanding a
property interest as a "privilege" forces a focus on the community of interests
being harmed by the use. In contrast, a property "right"-as understood by the
person asserting the right-can exist in isolation from that community, and
more to the point, as protection against it.
The examples in the previous section-or any understanding of property-
only make sense if we consider both sides of the relationship at the same time.
In the land-use context, the distinction between a right and a privilege is
simultaneously obvious and hidden, depending on the scale at which the issue
is addressed. A primary goal of legal analysis-and of legal communication
and education between the legal academy and its experts and the relevant and
regulated public-is to identify and describe that scale at which legal
relationships are both best and most easily understood. Outside of questions of
actual physical jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state, or local governments), 127 we do
not often think of legal distinctions as questions of scale. That is a mistake,
complicating our understanding of both property interests and property
disputes.
Many property disputes occur when an individual landowner protests some
governmental act he perceives as being unduly restrictive.128 In such disputes,
the scale at which the property interests are considered consists of a single
parcel of land, with a single landowner, affected by a single act of government.
But that is not the only scale available for considering property disputes.
Geography understands scale as representing different approaches for
understanding or framing a particular problem or phenomenon. 129 We tend to
127. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARv. L. REV.
1763, 1766 (2002); Donald F. Norris, Prospects for Regional Governance Under the New
Regionalism: Economic Imperatives Versus Political Impediments, 23 J. URBAN AFFAIRS
557, 557-58 (2001); Stephen Wheeler, The New Regionalism: Key Characteristics of an
Emerging Movement, 68 J. AMER. PLANNING Ass'N 267 (2002); William Blomquist & Edella
Schlager, Political Pitfalls of Integrated Watershed Management, 18 Soc'Y. & NAT. RES.
101, 102 (2005).
128. This is the foundation for virtually every regulatory takings case. See, e.g.,
DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.01 (5th ed. 2003).
129. See D.R. MONTELLO, Scale in Geography, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF




think of geography as focusing primarily on spatial scale, but it also addresses
temporal scale and thematic scale.' 30 Within these general approaches, scale
can refer to the physical representation of a phenomenon (cartographic scale),
the boundaries of a particular investigation (analysis scale), or the actual size at
which the phenomenon occurs, regardless of how it is characterized or studied
(phenomenon scale). 131
In the resolution of legal disputes, there is often a significant difference
between analysis scale-the boundaries of the specific dispute-and the actual
phenomenon scale. Often the analysis scale is constrained-appropriately in
many cases-by jurisdictional issues. 132 But this can lead to absurd results.
For example, in 2000, a group of environmental organizations challenged a
decision by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") to lease forty-nine
discrete parcels of the public lands for natural gas development. 133  The
environmental organizations claimed that the BLM failed to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") before offering the leases for
sale. 134 In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
determined that the BLM failed to comply with NEPA. 135 The court ordered
the agency to prepare the appropriate environmental documents before offering
the leases for sale. 136  Between February 2000 (the date of the original
challenged lease sale) and August 10, 2004, when the Tenth Circuit finally
determined that the BLM violated NEPA, the agency issued 285 leases,
covering 170,663 total acres.' 37 Developers had already drilled 114 new wells
on these lease parcels.' 38 All of the leases were issued without complying with
NEPA. 139 Because the appeal only considered three leases, only those three
leases were stayed pending the four-year resolution of the case.140
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and standing are all examples of
statutorily or jurisprudentially imposed limitations on analysis scale.
133. See Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. United States Dep't. of the Interior, 377 F.3d 1147,
1152 (10th Cir. 2004).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1162.
136. See id.
137. See Bureau of Land Management, Environmental Assessment Oil and Gas








Why were the analysis scale (the three leases) and the phenomenon scale
(all coal bed methane leasing in Wyoming) so different? Because the plaintiffs
only demonstrated that they actually used three of the original forty-nine lease
parcels, and thus only established standing to challenge those three leases.
14 1
While this outcome might have been required by the Supreme Court's standing
jurisprudence,142 the decision created an analysis scale completely disconnected
from the phenomenon scale, despite the obvious conditions on the ground.
Even though the Supreme Court's Article III cases and controversies
jurisprudence may have mandated such a decision, the fact that the chosen
scale of analysis could not address the phenomenon purportedly being analyzed
does not change.
In a property context, this disconnect between analysis scale and
phenomenon scale is less apparent but no less significant. And it is directly
connected to the rights-privileges distinction. As the Pennaco leasing decision
demonstrates, legal disputes often focus on an arbitrarily limited analysis scale,
without any explicit (or even implicit) consideration of the appropriate
phenomenon scale. 14 3  In many cases, arbitrary jurisdictional boundaries
require legal analyses without the benefit of understanding and using an
appropriate cartographic scale. 144 Unfortunately, for the typical landowner
facing undesirable land-use regulation, this discussion misunderstands the role
that scale plays in determining the rhetorical landscape, and in many cases, the
political (if not legal) outcome. For that aggrieved landowner, the analysis
scale is the phenomenon scale: the perceived effect on the individual landowner
is all that matters-there is no other broader phenomenon to consider.
That characterization of the claimed phenomenon scale of land-use
disputes makes the right-privilege distinction somewhat difficult to tease out in
141. See Wyoming Outdoor Council, et al., 153 I.B.L.A. 379, 380-81, 389-90 (Oct. 6,
2000).
142. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (requiring a
"description of concrete plans" to visit the specific location where the harm would occur);
see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1152 (2009) (requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate specific connections to specific parcels of land where the Forest Service's
salvage timber sale procedures would cause legal harm).
143. Without using this language, Judge Posner describes how judges engage in both
analysis scale and phenomenon scale decision making as they balance the various desirable
policy outcomes relevant to a particular case, e.g., that the specific outcome be fair, that the
outcome in the specific case be consistent with broader policy concerns, that the outcome be
consistent with previous decisions, etc. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 64 (2003).
144. For a classic treatment of this issue, see WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE
HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 274-
82 (Penguin Books 1992) (1954).
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individual controversies. But it also demonstrates the rhetorical value in
making that distinction. The usefulness of Hohfeld's property interests lies in
the explicit recognition of correlatives-that each property interest is defined
by its relationship to affected interests. The independent, isolated landowner
holding steadfastly to his "right" in opposition to the Leviathan need not
consider the effect of that right on his neighbor, at least not beyond the
somewhat abstract reasoning that his right benefits the community in the sense
that we are all better off if we have similar, isolated rights. At this scale, with
its focus on the individual as individual (rather than as member of a
community), there are no other actors, save for the Leviathan. The only
possible way to understand property is in a libertarian state of "use however the
owner sees fit," subject only to the very minimum regulation necessary to
ensure a functioning civil society: "[t]he private rights of individual
relationships are thereby preserved as much as possible even after the
formation of civil society, modified only to secure the internal and external
peace for which the political power is necessary."'
145
But an appropriate phenomenon-scale approach that properly incorporates
the off-parcel effects of particular activities makes it more obvious that we need
another way to complete our understanding of the property interests at issue.
The phenomenon-scale approach necessarily recognizes that there are
competing property interests, with the Leviathan nowhere to be found.
14 6
Without the Leviathan, the only way to make sense of the relationship is to
focus on the effect on the adjoining landowner. But for the adjoining
landowner who suffers from the odors of a stockyard, for example,
147
identifying legal interests possessed by the stockyard operator is pointless.
What would those legal interests represent if not the ability to cause harm to the
neighbor? The focus then moves, appropriately, to the fact that it is not the
stockyard operator that has a legally protected right to operate the stockyard,
but rather the neighbor who lacks a legally-protected right to prohibit operation
of the stockyard.
That is not to say that the stockyard operator does not possess a legal
interest. Upon recognizing that the stockyard neighbor has "no right" to
prohibit its operation, it is clear that the stockyard operator's legal interest is a
privilege. At this point, the situation begs a simple question: which land-use
activity should the community allow? The community can either choose to
145. Epstein, supra note 45, at 12-13.
146. The trained and domesticated Leviathan-the community-is, of course, the
ultimate enforcer of the property interest. But assuming an enforcement mechanism, we do
not need the Leviathan to understand the nature of the interest to be enforced.
147. For a classic example of a nuisance case, see Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Web
Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Az. 1972).
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prefer the stockyard, and formalize the privilege and neighbors' absence of any
right to stop it. Or the community can choose to prefer the stockyard-free
condition, without the odors and other negative effects of its operation. And
the choice made might vary over time in the same place, depending on the
nature of the interests involved. 148 What should be clear about this situation is
that nothing inherent in the land, nor in the landowners, recommends or
requires either outcome. 1
49
IV. COMPETING "RIGHTS" AND THE RHETORIC OF BEACH SAND
The primary relevance of the distinction between rights and privileges is in
its effect on the stories the parties (and the community) create as they go about
articulating the future that describes the best outcome to a particular conflict.
Consider again the two neighbors, one with the smelly stockyard and the other
in his or her pristine (or ideally so) rural retreat. Assume both arrived and
began their competing uses simultaneously. Negotiations over the years have
failed, and the rural retreat neighbor, finally fed up with the smells and
"nuisance," appeals to a sympathetic board of county commissioners. After
appropriate study, and consistent with duly enacted local land-use plans, the
commissioners choose to prohibit stockyards in this particular area. The
stockyard operator challenges the outcome. What result?
In the ideal rhetorical world I am proposing, a court would balance the
various interests articulated by the community, assess the process used to reach
the community decision, potentially require or approve some form of
amortization, 50 and approve the rezone. What the court should not do, in this
148. See, e.g., Spur Industries, 494 P.2d at 707-08. While the Arizona Supreme Court
required indemnification on the facts of this case, it also recognized that under certain
circumstances, particularly the normal expansion of an urban area into an agricultural area,
the privilege of operating the stockyard might change to a duty not to operate the stockyard,
without the payment of compensation, either by a private claimant or the government. Id As
the U.S. Supreme Court noted almost a century ago, "a vested interest cannot be asserted
against it because of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude development and
fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be progress, and if in its march
private interests are in the way, they must yield to the good of the community." Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
149. For another approach to this same issue involving different property interests, see
Freyfogle, supra note 54, at vii-x (discussing Lenk v. Spezia, 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App.
1949)).
150. Because changes in land-use regimes often affect significant investments in
existing businesses or installations, many state and local governments allow the elimination
of the now non-conforming uses or installations with amortization of that investment over a
period of time before the use must finally cease. See Mandelker, supra note 128, at § 5.82;
Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 24, § 4.39, at 122-23.
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context, is assume that the stockyard operator already possesses "rights" to
operate the stockyard. But most courts begin with an assumption of rights.
One compendium of land use law, in a section titled "Rights of Property
Owners," notes that "[i]n the adoption of zoning changes, consideration
generally must be given to the rights of the individual landowner of the
property involved, as well as the interests of adjoining landowners and
others."'151 Whether a right exists is the very question being asked, but courts
regularly start with an assumption of rights and proceed from there.
An explicit component of this discussion is the recognition that legitimate
interests can conflict. In the Coasean parable, the rancher's interests in raising
beef conflicts with the farmer's interests in raising crops.' 52 Coase recognized
that the "cost of exercising a right ... is always the loss which is suffered
elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that right[.]"' 15 3 Coase, "above
all," recommended that the assignment of legally-protected property interests,
or the creation or evolution of social arrangements that govern the assignment
or exercise of those interests, take into account both the gains and losses that
would result from any particular assignment:
It would clearly be desirable if the only actions performed were those
in which what was gained was worth more than what was lost. But in
choosing between social arrangements within the context of which
individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change
in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some
decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore we
have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various
social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a
government department) as well as the costs involved in moving to a
new system. In devising and choosing between social arrangements we
should have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in
approach which I am advocating.1
54
For our purposes, Coase is important because of his focus on the moment
when property interests are initially ordered and assigned. 155 More important is
his focus on the positive and negative effects of particular assignments and his
recognition that property "rights" are the result of a specific choice to prefer
one setting or circumstance over another. 156 Coase's farmer and rancher were
151. 101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning § 71 (2005).
152. Coase, supra note 19.
153. Id. at 44.
154. Id.




not arguing about which one had the greater legally-protected property
interest.157 Rather, they were arguing about who should have the only legally-
protected property interest in this context--either the rancher had the duty to
keep his cows from trespassing by building a fence (and the farmer a
correlative right to be free from the cows), or the farmer had no right to require
the rancher to build a fence to control the cows (and the rancher had the
correlative privilege to let his cows wander). 158 In this context, the notion of
"conflicting rights" does not make much sense. It is the assertions of rights
that conflict, not the boundary between the legal interests that are ultimately
assigned. Once a right is assigned, its boundaries are established, and there
should be no conflict remaining-that is the very purpose of the decision to
assign the right. But what happens when a court, particularly the Supreme
Court, talks of "subordinate" rights?
A. Conflicting "Rights" in Stop the Beach Renourishment
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision specifically
addressing how we define various, potentially competing, property interests. 
159
While most of the commentary on that case has focused on the application of
the Fifth Amendment's takings clause to judicial decisions,16 for the purposes
of this article, the decision's most interesting aspect is how the Court described
the property interests at stake in the context of articulating who owns those
interests. With apparently little concern for the consequences of particular
word choices, the Court ignored more useful and accurate means of describing
the conflict before it, adding both semantic and practical confusion to an
already complicated dispute.' 61 To be sure, the Florida Supreme Court initiated
the confusion, but the U.S. Supreme Court unnecessarily continued it.1
62
The dispute before the Court required consideration of the two simple
questions that arise in the first few weeks of a first semester Property law
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2597-98, 2611 (2010).
160. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Pefialver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or
Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 305, 306 (2012); D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities
of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 903, 903-04 (2011); Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus,
Judicial Takings and Scalia's Shifting Sands, 35 VERMONT L. REv. 423, 424 (2011). But see
Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Jus
Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (2011).
161. Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1111 (Fla.




course. 63  First, and most comfortable to most current or prospective
landowners, whether lawyers or not, is the question of who owns a particular
piece of land-a newly created strip of beach. 164 Second, and more important,
is the question of what it means to own something.1 65 The Court did not, and of
course could not, shy away from this second question, because even after
determining that the State of Florida owned the new strip of beach, it had to
determine what that ownership meant in relationship to the equally valid
ownership of the neighboring piece of dry land. 166 But it was on this point that
the Court failed to heed or understand the advice of Holmes, Coase and
others-including, of course, Hohfeld-that it is the relationship that
determines the property interest, not the assumed property interest that
determines the relationship.
The beaches near the City of Destin in Walton County, Florida suffered
significant cumulative erosion due to Hurricanes Erin and Opal in 1995,
Hurricane Georges in 1998, and Tropical Storm Isidore in 2002. Florida
enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act in 1986,168 having recognized
that "beach erosion is a serious menace to the economy and general welfare of
the people of this state."' 169 This Act authorized local units of government to
request permission to use Florida's sovereign lands (those lands seaward of the
mean high water line) for the renourishment of critically-eroded beaches. 170 In
2003, after a series of studies and construction design conferences with the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), Walton County and
the City of Destin requested permits for coastal construction and use of Florida
163. See supra Section 2.
164. See Walton, 998 So. 2d at 1111.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Unless otherwise noted, the facts of the case are taken from the original district
court opinion, Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), decision quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff'd sub nom. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010); see also
Consolidated Notice of Intent to Issue Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use
Sovereign Submerged Lands, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl.
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2009) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 2576003 [hereinafter Notice of
Intent].
168. See Fla. Stat. § 161.011 (2012).
169. Fla. Stat. § 161.088.
170. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 161.041.
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sovereign lands to renourish 6.9 miles of beach.1 7' In 2005, the Florida DEP
granted the permits. 72
In Florida, the owners of land abutting navigable waters, or waters subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide, possess certain property interests that depend in
varying degrees on the particular parcel's relationship to other parcels.
73
These interests include the ability to access the water, and the ability to obtain
certain interests in new land that accretes or relicts to the littoral property.1
74
The Florida Supreme Court described these interests as follows: "upland
owners hold several special or exclusive common law littoral rights: (1) the
right to have access to the water; (2) the right to reasonably use the water; (3)
the right to accretion and reliction; and (4) the right to the unobstructed view of
the water.' '175 The Florida court went on to describe these rights as being "such
as are necessary for the use and enjoyment of the upland property, but these
rights may not be so exercised as to injure others in their lawful rights."'
176
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Florida court's basic understanding of
the dispute, both in terms of the property interests at stake, and the manner in
which those property interests interact. The Court noted that the first "core
principle" of Florida law was that "the State as owner of the submerged land
adjacent to littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not
interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral landowners."'
77
The Court further described the conflict as being a question of which rights
were subordinate. ' 7 Thus, "Florida law as it stood before the decision below
allowed the State to fill in its own seabed, and the resulting sudden exposure of
previously submerged land was treated like an avulsion for purposes of
ownership. The right to accretions was therefore subordinate to the State's
right to fill."' 7 9
While it might seem useful initially to characterize this conflict as a
question of which "rights" were better, or more important, or superior in a
given context, that characterization is somewhat illogical. This approach
171. Notice of Intent, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151),
2009 WL 2576003 (2009).
172. Id.
173. Save Our Beaches v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Protection, 27 So.3d 48, 57 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
174. Id.
175. Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1111 (Fla.
2008) aff'dsub nom., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
176. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
177. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2611 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 2611-612.
179. Id. at 2611 (emphasis added).
2012/13]
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
misunderstands the meaning of the word "right" in a legal context, and
complicates, rather than facilitates, reaching an appropriate final outcome.
Perhaps more significant, this approach also misunderstands the meaning of the
word "right" in a non-legal context. For many people in this country, the
notion that the government might have "rights" that are superior to the rights of
an individual would seem nonsensical. These same people would argue that
the very purpose of a legal right is to establish a boundary between various
potentially competing interests. If I have a right in some setting, necessarily,
no other interest holder has a superior right in the same setting.
Yet at the same time, the notion that two adjoining landowners might have
competing interests is both widely understood and accepted by the public and
legal communities alike.'8 0 The law is but a reflection of public habit, and legal
principles like nuisance reflect an engrained public understanding that
freedoms can be limited in the event they cause harm. But describing this
understanding as competing rights does not adequately represent that inherent
understanding. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the state's rights end where
the private landowner's rights begin; there is no overlap, subordination, or
competition between "rights." While the Court's holding may have been the
same, the Court's analysis, and the public's understanding of and respect for it,
would have been simplified had it recognized this fact.
But perhaps more significant, we do not need a Hohfeldian understanding
to appreciate the problems with the Court's "subordinate" rights rhetoric. The
crucial question in Stop the Beach Renourishment-from a property-interest
perspective-was not which landowner had the "greater" right, but rather
whether the legal consequences of a specific factual occurrence-an avulsion-
would extend to an avulsion that occurred artificially. In other words, the issue
was how to define "avulsion." If an avulsion had occurred, the littoral
landowner had no rights to the land under long-standing riparian law. 18 1 Once
the Supreme Court determined that the state's act of filling its sovereign lands
would be-and always had been, for legal purposes-treated as an "avulsion"
for property-allocation purposes, the case's primary dispute had been resolved,
and it need not have stated, in the next sentence, that the littoral landowners
rights were "subordinate" to the state's right to fill. 182 It is unnecessary to
compare hypothetical rights in two discrete factual scenarios-avulsion and
accretion-that cannot happen at the same time in the same place.
180. This understanding is the foundation of the classic limitation on property: "sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." See David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the
Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497,
502 (2004).




Returning to the Hohfeldian frame, the state's "right to fill" was not a right
at all, but rather a privilege to fill, with the correlative lack of right to prevent
the fill in the littoral landowners. Put another way, according to Florida law,
the littoral landowners have no right to prevent "avulsions"-whether natural
or not-so as to protect access to some potential accretion in the future.' 3 The
"right to accretions" does not extend that far. 1 4 The landowners have a right to
access the water, with Florida's correlative duty not to impede that access, but
that right is not affected by the State's privilege interest in avulsions-a
privilege which does not extend to impeding access.'8 5 In other words, it is
possible to describe the entirety of property relations in the dispute without
resorting to a rhetoric of "subordinate" or conflicting rights.
B. Miller v. Schoene: Avoiding the Conflicting "Rights" Minefield
Courts have not always struggled rhetorically with conflicting property
interests. In the classic property case Miller v. Schoene, the United States
Supreme Court faced a Coasean dispute in which it had to assess the validity of
a community's choice to prefer one property setting over another-specifically,
a decision to assign a property right to one type of interest rather than to
recognize and continue a legitimate privilege in another. 86  Rather than
offering a confusing discussion of competing or subordinate "rights," the Miller
v. Schoene Court assessed the conflict for what it was: a community's choice
about what types of land uses and harmful effects it should allow.187 Miller v.
Schoene might be an anomaly in a history of rights rhetoric, but it demonstrates
how a more careful consideration of property interests and relationships
facilitates dispute resolution.
The conflict was relatively simple. The Red Cedar Tree, 188 indigenous to
the eastern United States, is host to the cedar-apple rust, a fungal plant
183. This is the basic holding of Stop the Beach Renourishment, recast in Hohfeldian
terms. See id. at 2612.
184. See id. at 2611.
185. Again, this is the Court's basic holding recast in Hohfeldian terms. See id. at
2611-12.
186. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
187. Miller v. Schoene has been the subject of a number of law review articles
assessing or criticizing the property assignment choice identified here. See generally Warren
J. Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 435
(1971); see also James M. Buchanan, An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v.
Schoene, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 439, 451 (1972).
188. The eastern red cedar tree is not a cedar at all, but is rather a type of juniper,
Juniperus virginiana. It is named a "cedar" because early settlers confused it with European
2012/13]
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
disease.' 89 While the fungus does not significantly harm the cedar tree, the
fungus does harm its co-host, the apple tree.190 The rust requires both trees to
survive, overwintering on the cedar and infecting the apple in the summer.91
Unfortunately, the rust causes substantial harm to apple trees, causing
premature defoliation of the leaves and small, misshapen, and marked 
fruits.192
The fungus's two-host requirement suggests a straightforward method of
control: separate the trees.
193
In the early twentieth century, apples were an important agricultural
product in Virginia. 194 Due to the economic harm the cedar-apple rust might
cause, the Virginia legislature enacted the "Cedar Rust Act" in 1914.195 The
Act made it illegal to "keep alive and standing" any cedar or other tree infected
by the rust.196 The Act further declared all such trees within a specific distance
of an apple orchard to be a public nuisance, and authorized the State
Etymologist to order the destruction of any infected cedar trees within two
miles of an apple orchard, under certain conditions. 97 The Act did not require
any reimbursement of the value of the infected cedar tree: "Neither the
judgment of the court nor the statute as interpreted allows compensation for the
value of the standing cedars or the decrease in the market value of the realty
caused by their destruction whether considered as ornamental trees or
otherwise."
'1 98
Given the authorization to destroy trees without compensation, Miller v.
Schoene is unsurprisingly about the claim of a landowner that the Cedar Rust
Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of property without
due process of law.199 What might be surprising, at least to modem observers
cedars based on a hope that it might have the same economic value. See WILLIAM CRONON,
CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND, 9 (2003).
189. For a contemporary discussion of the cedar-apple rust and its effect on apple
trees, see James LeRoy Weimer, Three Cedar Rust Fungi. Their Life Histories and the
Diseases They Produce, 390 CORNELL UNIV. AGRIC. EXPERIMENT STATION BULL. 509 (May
1917).
190. Ronald H. Peterson, The Rust Fungus Life Cycle, 40 BOT. REV. 453, 454 (1974).
191. See id. at456-57.
192. Miller, 276 U.S. at 278.
193. "The only practicable method of controlling the disease and protecting apple
trees from its ravages is the destruction of all red cedar trees, subject to the infection, located
within two miles of apple orchards." Id. at 278-79.
194. Id. at 279.
195. See id. at 278.
196. Id. at 277.
197. Id. at 278.




of land-use disputes, is that the Court never uses the phrase "property rights,"
nor even the word "rights," in analyzing the dispute. The Court instead
recognized this conflict for what it was-the intersection of legitimate, but
incompatible, property interests in which a "rights" rhetoric would be of little
use. Prior to the emergence of the cedar rust in Virginia, no relationship
existed between growers of cedars and apples trees that required any
exploration of which might have a right relative to the other.200 At the moment
the dispute arose, no rights existed for either party.
The most crucial aspect of this particular dispute is that it involved two
incompatible property interests. Whatever the government chose to do-to act
or not to act-would have harmed or eliminated one of those property
interests.201 It is this aspect of the dispute that is often ignored in similar
modem disputes. The Court recognized that Virginia was
under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation of
one class of property and that of the other wherever both existed in
dangerous proximity. It would have been none the less a choice if,
instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had
permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go
on unchecked.20 2
This choice exists whether the legislature or a court in a nuisance action is
assigning or not assigning the right.
Most property disputes involve similar choices. Choosing to regulate
water pollution, for example, limits to some extent the ability of the regulated
landowner to use his or her property. But failing to regulate water pollution
causes some harm to downstream landowners. This type of dispute is precisely
the type that land-use or environmental regulation seeks to address. As the
Court noted, "[w]hen forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property
in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater
value to the public., 20 3 It is therefore the public interest, or "considerations of
200. See Buchanan, supra note 187, at 441 (acknowledging this point but criticizing
the decision - and the legislative choice - from a law and economics perspective).
Buchanan argues that the parties agreed that the cedar tree owners had a right (or more
accurate, a privilege) to grow diseased trees notwithstanding the harm to apple growers. He
bases this argument on the apparent lack of claims made by apple growers against cedar
growers to cease the growing of diseased trees. See id. at 441, n. 8 and accompanying text.





social policy," that determines the appropriate outcome to the dispute.
2 °4 It is
not a pre-conceived and untested notion of "rights." In this case, which "right"
would be greater? The right of a landowner to have ornamental cedar trees, or
the right of an orchard owner to have disease-free apples? If both are "rights,"
how might we decide between the two?
Comparing Miller v. Shoene to Stop the Beach Renourishment suggests the
Court has adopted (or continued) its own property rights rhetoric over the past
century. But it is not just this most recent case that demonstrates the Court's
over-reliance on the rhetorical power of the word "right." Particularly in land-
use or regulatory takings cases, the Court habitually begins with an assumption
of property rights before assessing what should be the more appropriate
question: of two competing interests, which should we prefer and protect?
Even when the property rights assumption is not explicit, the Court reveals its
assumption in its approach to the issue.
For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court
considered a state statutory regime that attempted to balance the development
interests of private landowners with the state's legitimate police power
20
concerns regarding eroding barrier islands. 205 By the 1980s, the negative
effects of development on barrier islands and beaches were widely
206
understood. Because natural beaches and shorelines are more durable than
human-reinforced shorelines, the best approach to preserving those shorelines
207
is to prohibit development. The South Carolina program, therefore,
established a setback line and prohibited development on the seaward side of
208
this line. Unfortunately for Mr. Lucas, he owned two lots within this new
setback.20 9
Now two decades after the decision, hundreds of law review articles
analyze its effect on regulatory takings jurisprudence, and several thousand
204. Id. at 280.
205. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
206. See Robert Dolan & Paul Godfrey, Effects of Hurricane Ginger on the Barrier
Islands of North Carolina, 84 GEO. Soc'Y AMER. BULL. 1329, 1331 (1973); J.G. Bartlett,
D.M. Mageean, & R.J. O'Connor, Residential Expansion as a Continental Threat to U.S.
Coastal Ecosystems, 21 POPULATION & ENV'T 429, 461 (2000); M.T. EI-Ashry, Causes of
Recent Increased Erosion Along United States Shorelines, 82 GEOL. SOC'Y AMER. BULL.
2033,2033 (1971). But see Robert A. Morton, Temporal and Spatial Variations in Shoreline
Changes and Their Implications, Examples from the Texas Gulf Coast, 49 J. SED.
PETROLOGY 1101, 1108 (1979).
207. See Dolan & Godfrey, supra note 206, at 1331.




more cite to the case in some fashion.2 10 The case also appears in casebooks
211 212 213teaching property, environmental law, land use law, constitutional
law,214 and perhaps others. The take-home message for law students is
relatively simple: a regulatory provision that deprives a landowner of all
economically beneficial use of his or her property is a categorical taking
requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment, unless the land use
activity prohibited would not have been allowed under the particular state's
background principles of property or nuisance law.215 For my present
purposes, the case is interesting not for the specific substantive outcome, but
rather the manner in which the Court considered and communicated that
outcome. From this perspective, the fundamental issue in cases like Lucas is
not whether a complete deprivation of all economically beneficial use occurred,
but rather how we should define the property interest at issue. In other words,
the Lucas Court analyzed the case backwards: assuming a property right,
identifying the effect of a regulation on that property right, and then, only after
the fact, thinking about whether the landowner had any capacity to use the land
in the proposed fashion to begin with. That is to say, the Court waited until
after assuming a property right and analyzing the effect of a regulatory
provision on that property right before it got around to determining--or rather,
acknowledging that someone should determine-whether a property right
existed in the first place. The Court did this even as it recognized that the
"background principles" discussion is "the logically antecedent inquiry."
216
While the substantive outcome might not change were a court to consider the
logically antecedent inquiry first, the rhetorical effect would.
The Lucas approach is both conceptually and practically problematic. The
practical problems are amply demonstrated in the wonderful (from a
210. Clicking the "citing references" tab above the case in WestlawNext reveals 1,548
cases and 4,482 secondary sources citing to the case.
211. JESSE DUKEMINIER, ETAL., PROPERTY, 1131 (7th ed. 2010); EDWARD H. RABIN, ET
AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW, 675 (6th ed. 2011).
212. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, &
POLICY 739 (5th ed. 2006); DANIEL A. FARBER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 347 (8th ed. 2010).
213. JOHN R. NOLON, ET AL., LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 421 (7th ed. 2008); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 169 (3d ed. 2005); DAVID L. CALLIES, ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 324 (5th ed. 2008).
214. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517 (7th ed.
2004); DANIEL A. FARBER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S
THIRD CENTURY, 469 (3rd ed. 2003).
215. Id. at473.




pedagogical perspective) case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. In many ways,
Palazzolo presented a perfect set of facts to push back against what the plaintiff
(and his lawyers) 218 considered an overzealous regulatory state. Mr. Palazzolo
had been attempting to develop his land in some fashion since 1962.219 In a
number of proposals over two decades, Mr. Palazzolo proposed filling
approximately eighteen acres of coastal wetlands to allow construction of a
beach club and subdivision. 22  After Mr. Palazzolo initiated his proposal and
received a few of the necessary government approvals, Rhode Island adopted a
new coastal resource regime that prohibited the filling of the coastal wetlands
on the Palazzolo parcel.221
To the extent we discuss the Supreme Court's decision in public or in law
school classrooms, our discussions tend to focus on two components of the
case: the Court's determinations that (1) any remaining economically viable
use-even if less than ten percent of the value of the landowner's proposed
use-does not rise to the level of a "categorical taking under Lucas," and (2)
the mere passage of title after the effective date of a regulation does not bar a
regulatory takings claim by creating a background principle of the state's law
of property. 222 This last point was cause for some celebration among private
property advocates:
Today, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, handing a major victory to landowners and a defeat to state and
local governments. This closely-watched case, in which a landowner
has been fighting the state since 1962 to develop his beach-front
property, has sustained national prominence. The outcome of the case
helps define the boundary of permissible land use as regulated by
individual states and the Federal government.
223
217. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
218. Mr. Palazzolo received legal and financial support at the Supreme Court from the
Pacific Legal Foundation, a national property rights organization. See About PLF, PACIFIC
LEGAL (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=262.
219. For a chronology of the case up to 2001 (immediately following the Supreme
Court's decision), see Analytical Chronology of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 30 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 171, 174 (2002-2003) [hereinafter Analytical Chronology].
220. Id. at 174-75, 178-79.
221. See id. at 174-75.
222. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the Decline of Justice Scalia's
Categorical Takings Doctrine, 30 B.C. ENVT'L. AFF. L. REV. 137, 138, 144 (2002); Carol
Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival
of Takings Claims after Property Transfers, 36 CoNN. L. REV. 7, 13-14 (2003).
223. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island; Regulatory Takings Case Decided in Favor of
Landowner, BUSINESS WIRE (June 28, 2001), available at
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Of course, the Supreme Court's approach to any case is limited by the
procedural history and factual determinations presented to it. 224 On its surface,
stripped of all the nuances and intricacies that make property disputes
fascinating, the Pallazolo case might have seemed like a success for anti-
regulation activists, particularly in its holding on the effect of post-acquisition
225regulatory enactments on the background principles determination. But we
find the real significance of Mr. Palazzolo's claims after the case left the
Supreme Court. On July 5, 2005, almost twenty years after Mr. Palazzolo first
challenged Rhode Island's regulation of his land,226 and more than forty years
after he first purchased the land, a Rhode Island Superior Court determined that
based on the public trust doctrine and the state's background principles of
property and nuisance law, Mr. Palazzolo did not have the property rights he
claimed, and that his land would in fact likely be worth more to him after
regulatory enforcement than without it. 227  That determination should have
come first, rather than last.228
A property-rights rhetoric was neither the sole nor primary cause of Mr.
Palazzolo's unfortunate journey through our legal system. The original trial
court may have made a key factual error regarding when Mr. Palazzolo
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Palazzolo+v.+Rhode+lsland%3B+Regulatory+Takings+Case
+Decided+in+Favor. . .-a075997773.
224. "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In
all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
225. Although to be sure, the case does not indicate that new statutory provisions can
never affect a landowners legitimate expectations: "Today's holding does not mean that the
timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the
Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration
from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance." Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226. See Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 86-1496, 1995 WL
941370, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995) (indicating that Mr. Palazzolo filed his initial
complaint on April 3, 1986).
227. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *7 (R.I.
Super. Ct. July 5, 2005).
228. This is partly Mr. Palazzolo's doing, given his argument that the regulations
deprived him of all economically beneficial use, and thus were a per se taking under Lucas.
The trial court did have the opportunity to engage in a Penn Central analysis, but its review
was somewhat cursory given its initial determination that Mr. Palazzolo's investment backed
expectations were limited by the legislative enactment that allegedly occurred after he
purchased the property. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714-15 (R.I.




acquired the land.229 This error influenced its cursory Penn Central analysis.
But even so, Mr. Palazzolo's experience does identify a potential problem with
the Lucas-demonstrated habit of assuming property rights at the outset of our
property-interest-allocating conversations. It is not that the initial rhetorical
assumptions necessarily determine the outcome. There are many examples of
cases-Palazzolo included-in which a court begins with a property-rights
rhetoric but still upholds a "communitarian" allocation of property interests.
23
1
Rather, the property rights assumptions have the potential to increase our
transaction costs by obfuscating the variety of legitimate interests at play in any
given dispute, and particularly the legitimate property interests held by
neighboring landowners and the community at large. A property-rights rhetoric
is not only potentially anti-communitarian, but also inefficient and it
complicates the formation and protection of the very property interests the
rhetoric allegedly seeks to support. Nonetheless, our courts continue to follow
this inefficient and ineffective path.
V. CONCEDING BY EXAMPLE: HOW THE ACADEMY FAILS TO MODEL CLARITY
Private property is in bad shape today,
not economically or politically, but rather intellectually.
232
Given our broader cultural trajectory, and the role of "rights" in explaining
much of that trajectory, it is unsurprising that the land-owning public might
prefer a rights-oriented rhetoric when discussing the proper role of the state in
regulating the use of land. While we might expect more out of our court
system, the idea that our judges and justices might eschew Hohfeldian nuance
in favor of a rights rhetoric is also understandable. It was, of course, a lack of
precision in contemporary jurisprudence that motivated Hohfeld in the first
place. 233 Perhaps more significant, courts also largely respond to-and adopt
the language of-the arguments presented to them. It is that last point that is
most troubling. Even those who are defending reasonable land-use regulation,
229. See Analytical Chronology, supra note 219, at 176.
230. See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 713.
231. For example, in Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Killingworth,
before upholding a somewhat ad hoc application of the town's accessory use provisions, the
court begins by stating that "[b]ecause zoning regulations are in derogation of common-law
property rights, they must be strictly construed and not extended by implication." 894 A.2d
285, 291 (Conn. 2006).
232. Eric. T. Freyfogle, What is Land? A Broad Look at Private Rights and Public
Power, 58 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2006).
233. See Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 28.
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and the "rights" of a community versus the individual, adopt a potentially self-
defeating property-rights rhetoric. This is particularly concerning when those
advocates are academics or other similarly-situated individuals with both the
capacity and desire to influence the rhetorical landscape of the dispute. The use
of a rights rhetoric by academics and activists concedes the rhetorical landscape
to anti-regulatory advocates before a discussion of the appropriate allocation of
interests can even begin. If the purpose of the academy is to provide the
stories, explanations, or models that facilitate understanding, we might start by
recognizing where our language has the potential to confuse.
In his classic work on ownership, A. M. Honor6 identified eleven standard
incidents that are present in the "liberal concept of full individual
ownership., 234 Of the eleven incidents, eight are appropriately characterized as
235property interests consistent with the understanding of that term as used here.
Two of those eight are correlatives of Hohfeld's property interests, if not
236specifically recognized as such. Honor6 characterizes his first six incidents
as rights: to possess, to use, to manage, to the income, to the capital, and to
security. 237 Because Honor6 claims to generally disagree with the Hohfeldian
approach,238 it might seem unsurprising that he would not use property
privileges, even where appropriate. But in Ownership, Honor6 specifically and
intentionally adopts the Hohfeldian understanding of property.2 39 He does so
while simultaneously collapsing the interests into a rights short hand, saying,
"[i]n this article I identify rights with claims, liberties, etc.' '24° It is perhaps
appropriate for Honor6, within a distinctly academic work, to use "rights" as a
short hand for a much more nuanced understanding of property, and to leave
the recognition of that rhetorical move to a footnote and a different work. But
in other cases when the very purpose is to articulate a communitarian
understanding of property, in which property interests can and should evolve
over time and place in reaction to specific cultural or socio-ecological
conditions, that rights short hand is much less appropriate.
234. A. M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113-27
(A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
235. The remaining three incidents-transmissibility, absence of term, and residual
character-largely reflect the "duration" of ownership addressed in estates in land and future
interests concepts. See id. at 113-22.
236. See id. at 123. The incident of "the prohibition of harmful use" is better
understood as a property duty, and the incident of "liability to execution" is just that, a
liability that is correlative to a property power held by another.
237. Id. at 113-120.
238. Honor6, supra note 8, at 457 ("It seems preferable, therefore, to reject Hohfeld's
axioms.").




If we understand property as a political or social construct, 24 1 it is
appropriate to think about the specific political act that causes a particular
property interest to emerge. For example, Professor Daniel Bromley argues
that "property rights are not protected because they are, a priori, property
rights. Rather, those settings and circumstances that gain protection by the
Supreme Court acquire, by virtue of that protection, the status of property
rights. A property right is not the cause of protection but rather its effect."
2 42
In this understanding, it is only those circumstances that we decide to protect
using the coercive power of the state that earn the title "right." And if only
specific social or cultural settings or circumstances might give rise to a right,
new or changed settings or circumstances might justify reconsideration of those
"rights."
Given that understanding, the interesting component of Professor
Bromley's argument is not his perception of the Supreme Court's role in
determining what constitutes a property right, 243 but his use of the word "right"
itself. As suggested above, there are two very general strands of property
theory in American academia: natural rights and social construct. 244  The
natural rights approach understands property as pre-existing social organization
and thus, at some fundamental level, not subject to that organization's
regulation or control.245  Alternatively, the social construct understanding
recognizes property as existing to serve societal ends, and thus subject to the
regulation and control of that society.246 This understanding is neither new nor
inconsistent with the ideas or ideologies that founded the United States. As
Benjamin Franklin noted, "private Property therefore is a Creature of Society,
241. Not all property theorists are comfortable with this description of property. See,
e.g., Robert P. Burns, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN.
L. REv. 67, 67, 70 (1985). However, because my specific focus is on the effects of language
choices on our understandings of property, I will pass by natural rights theory for the
moment.
242. Daniel Bromley, This Land is Whose Land? 48 Wisc. ACAD. REv. 60,63 (2002).
243. Ultimately, we find out what constitutes a property "right" when a local
government changes its mind about what it will or will not allow. If it can take something
away that it previously allowed, that use was not legitimately a "right." But if the Supreme
Court (or, obviously, a lower or state court) determines the local government cannot change
its mind, the previously allowed use was, in fact, a property right. See, e.g., Lucas v. S. C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
244. Given that even a natural rights approach requires some conversation and
agreement about the appropriate structure and allocation of those "natural" rights, a natural
rights approach is really just one form of a social construct. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 347, 347 (1967).
245. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at vii-viii; Eric R. Claeys, Takings,
Regulations, andNatural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1549, 1554-55 (2003).
246. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 4, at 106.
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and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require
it, even to its last Farthing[.],,
247
Professor Bromley is among those in this second category, recognizing that
248property is fundamentally social. More to the point, Professor Bromley
adopts a "property relations" nomenclature to represent the "constellation of
benefits that give [property] its empirical content., 249 Bromley's purpose in
adopting the property relations approach is specifically to achieve the clarity
Hohfeld imagined.2 50 It is this aspect of his scholarship that is most curious:
despite explicitly recognizing the value of Hohfeldian nuance, Bromley
continues to describe our ongoing resource allocation discussions as being
significantly about "rights."
2 51
But Bromley is somewhat lonely in his explicit, if not pervasive , use of
Hohfeldian correlatives to explain and understand property interests.
Academics from a variety of disciplines ignore this potentially useful approach
to discussing property in favor of a rights rhetoric that concedes the rhetorical
landscape to anti-regulation advocates. Within the legal academy, there are a
number of property theorists that maintain the "competing rights" approach.
For example, Professor Freyfogle has written a number of books and articles
that are works in property theory. 252 Each of these works approaches property
253from a Franklinian social benefit understanding of property. But
247. Benjamin Franklin, Queries and Remarks on "Hints for the Members of the
Pennsylvania Convention " (Nov. 3, 1789) (unpublished), available at
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/yale?vol=46&page=344.
248. See BROMLEY, supra note 120, at 57.
249. Id. at 56.
250. Id. at 52-54. It says something about the traditional Property education in law
school, or at least my participation in that course, that it was not until I took a class in
Institutional Economics with Daniel Bromley - taken after I had graduated from law school
and practiced law for several years - that I first heard about Hohfeld and his property
correlatives.
251. See, e.g., DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1990); Bromley, supra note 242, at 63 (suggesting that only "rights" are
protected by government); Daniel W. Bromley, Formalising Property Relations in the
Developing World: The Wrong Prescription for the Wrong Malady, 26 LAND USE POL'Y 20,
21 (2009) ("To have a right - a civil right, a contractual right, or a property right - is to have
the capacity to compel some authority system to come to the defence [sic] of the specific
interest associated with that right. To have a right is to have the ability to command the
agents of government (or a similar authority structure) to come to your aid." (internal
citation omitted)).
252. See generally id; FREYFOGLE, supra note 54.
253. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 4, at 4 (describing approvingly Franklin's
understanding of the origins of private property); FREYFOGLE, supra note 54, at 10
("Property is inherently a social institution.").
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notwithstanding this fundamental premise-that property begins and ends with
the social arrangements that justify it-Freyfogle uses an exclusively rights-
based rhetoric in making this argument.254
In criticizing claims that any inherent rights exist in property, Freyfogle
bemoans the "muddled thinking about how the rights of one owner are
restrained by the rights of neighbors and about how private property rights fit
with the pursuit of the public's well being." 255 It is certainly appropriate to
address the role of a community in defining private interests in land, but in his
criticism, Freyfogle demonstrates the same rights-based "muddled" thinking.
256
For example, a few pages later he articulates the primary thesis of the book:
"[p]rivate property, in fact, has been an evolving, organic institution with
ownership rights that have varied greatly from era to era and place to place."
257
In response to legitimate concerns about the motivations for Oregon's Measure
25837, and the nationwide private property rights movement, Freyfogle
proposed a "landowner's bill of rights" to clarify the rights all landowners
hold.259 But perhaps Freyfogle's most interesting use of the rights rhetoric
occurs when he argues that rights can and should change: "[l]egitimate changes
in the prevailing laws of ownership-even new laws that fundamentally revise
the rights and responsibilities of ownership-are proper and often necessary
legal acts that landowners simply must accept.
260
Assuming the validity of a Hohfeldian approach, this language is both
unintentionally careless and potentially counterproductive. As understood by
much of the public, and certainly by property-rights activists, the phrase
"property right" does not allow for evolving understandings subject to the
whims of a given society, even if that is a widely recognized-if not
accepted-argument in the legal academy. 261 As Holmes famously argued,
"[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
[and] intuitions of public policy" are more important in identifying appropriate
254. FREYFOGLE, supra note 4, at 2.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
258. For a description of Measure 37, see, Micael C. Blumm & Erik Grafe, Enacting
Libertarian Property: Oregon's Measure 37 and Its Implications, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 279,
308 (2007).
259. See Freyfogle, supra note 232, at 3, 9; see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 54, at
151-55.
260. FREYFOGLE, supra note 4, at 273.
261. There are a wide variety of cases outside of this specific context (property) in
which the public has recognized that rights (or other legal interests) can and should change




outcomes than notions of a priori and immutable laws or rules. 2 62 But as noted
previously, for many people, rights, including importantly rights in land, are
"natural., 263 They pre-exist the state and social society. They stand "as the
bulwark of freedom from arbitrary government. ' 264 Property rights, in short,
are the last line of defense against the Leviathan, and as such, cannot be
diminished or altered by that Leviathan. The "felt necessities of the time" are
irrelevant in this understanding.
The law is not alone in elevating "rights" in its interest-allocation
decisions, as we find similar uses of "property rights" in related disciplines.
Harvey Jacobs, a planning professor whose work focuses in large part on our
understandings of property and the role of the state in its regulation, approaches
property from a similar Franklinian perspective that property is a creature of
society and subject to societal changes:
What's important about this legal and economic conception of
ownership is how it allows land to respond to changing social
circumstances. If land is conceived of as a bundle of rights, then rights
can be taken from or added to the bundle, and the very shape and
content of those rights can change.265
This passage demonstrates simultaneously the mischaracterization of
property interests of concern here, and the potential political consequences of
that mischaracterization. Jacobs' primary argument-that property interests
can change over time as social or community values change-is legitimate and
supported by the Supreme Court.26 6  But Jacobs' characterization of these
changing interests as "rights," and the notion that "rights" can be taken from
the bundle, and change over time, is again directly contrary to the
widespread-if colloquial-understanding of what the word "rights"
represents. To suggest that rights can be taken away is directly contrary to our
understanding of what it means to possess a legally-protected right, and the
argument thus immediately de-legitimates itself with the community it must
convince.
The use of a rights rhetoric places all of these arguments at a disadvantage
at the discussion's outset. If the conversation is about "rights," then it is
obvious to most participants how it should end. Proponents of reducing
262. HOLMES, supra note 87, at 1.
263. See supra notes 32-70 and accompanying text.
264. ELY, supra note 48, at 17.
265. JACOBS, supra note 54, at xi-xii.
266. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-60
(1964) (adjusting a landowner's "right to exclude" by prohibiting discrimination in allocated
rooms in a hotel).
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rights-as if any American would ever dare suggest such a thing-thus must
find other rhetorical approaches that might overcome this initial deficit.
Returning to Freyfogle, his recent efforts to connect land-use regulation to
267increased liberty are insightful. He begins with a summary of a commonland-use dispute:
In the typical tale used to frame discussions about private property
rights, an individual landowner is pitted in battle against a government
regulatory body. The landowner wants to exercise her individual
liberty by using her land in some way; the government body, desirous
of promoting some public conservation goal, opposes the proposed
land use and deploys a law to restrict it.2
68
As Freyfogle accurately notes, there are "countless" cases involving these
basic facts. 269 In each of them, the landowners perceive the two sides of the
dispute largely as Freyfogle articulates it: the individual landowner claiming
property rights on the one side, and the Leviathan seeking to take away those
270
rights on the other. There is no question that the regulation of property both
increases and decreases liberty, and it is worth discussing the various ways in
which things that might be characterized as a taking of rights actually do more
to increase liberty than restrict it. Although Freyfogle makes an effort to think
more carefully about the various relationships in a property dispute, note again
that the discussion begins with an assumption of property rights: "[t]he core
component of private property, I argue, is not the right to use land, nor is it
exactly the right to exclude. It is instead the right to halt interferences with
one's use of land.
271
Even at our most practical, as legal actors or advisors seeking to affect real
outcomes on the ground and avoid the effects of the property-rights meta-
narrative, we still use a rhetoric that reinforces that narrative. For example, one
mechanism to address the impacts of previous development or to reduce future
272
development is to "down zone" remaining undeveloped land z. While localgovernments are free to reduce the potential capacity to develop a specific
267. Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 75, 75 (2010).
268. Id. at 77.
269. Id. at 77 n.6.
270. See Freyfogle, supra note 232, at 3, 5-6.
271. Freyfogle, supra note 267, at 78.
272. "Down zoning" occurs when an area is re-zoned to a less intensive or less dense
use, e.g., from commercial to residential use, or from small lot residential zoning to
relatively larger lot residential zoning. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 128, at § 6.36.
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parcel, absent the recognition of some vested rights,27 3 those reductions in
274potential development capacity have significant political implications. In
order to reduce the political impact of reducing development capacity through a
zoning or other ordinance, in the 1960s, New York City implemented a density-
transfer mechanism as part of its landmarks preservation law. 275  This
approach, now known generally as a "transfer of development rights" ("TDR")
276program, spread across the country in the ensuing four decades. Described
simply, a TDR program allows the development "rights" to be severed from a
specific parcel and transferred to another parcel within a designated district,
often through the use of a development rights "market."
277
As the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated in Penn Central Transportation
Company v. City of New York, the transfer of development rights was not
strictly necessary to avoid paying compensation for the reduced development
278potential of a protected landmark. In fact, local governments are free to
reduce development potential by often significant margins without creating a
compensable regulatory taking: "several Supreme Court decisions suggest that
diminutions in value approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily dictate the
existence of a taking .... [T]his court has likewise relied on diminutions well
in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking.' 279 In other words,
273. Landowners are not guaranteed the continuation of any particular zoning
ordinance. But generally speaking, once a landowner relies on some affirmative
governmental act, rights vest to develop land in a manner consistent with that act. See, e.g.,
Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg'I Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 550 (Cal. 1976),
superseded by statute, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65864 (West 2009).
. 274. See Hershel J. Richman & Lane H. Kendig, Transfer Development Rights-A
Pragmatic View, 9 URB. LAW. 571, 571 (1977) (acknowledging that TDR programs emerged
in part to avoid regulatory takings problems).
275. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Pruetz
and Pruetz suggest that New York initiated a now four-decades long trend of "transfer of
development rights" programs. See Rick Pruetz & Erica Pruetz, Transfer of Development
Rights Turns 40, 59 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2007). Nelson et al. suggest that New York City
created the first transfer of development rights program in its original 1916 zoning
ordinance. See ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE TDR HANDBOOK: DESIGNING AND
IMPLEMENTING SUCCESSFUL TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS 3 (2012).
276. See Pruetz & Pruetz, supra note 275, at 3; Jennifer Frankel, Past, Present, and
Future Constitutional Challenges to Transferable Development Rights, 74 WASH. L. REV.
825, 829-30 (1999); Richman & Kendig, supra note 274, at 571 ("The Transfer of
Development Rights (TDR) has exploded on the planning scene."); Frank Schnidman,
Transferable Development Rights: An Idea in Search of Implementation, 11 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 339, 367 (1976); NELSON, supra note 275, at 3.
277. NELSON, supra note 275, at 3; see also Mandelker, supra note 128, at § 11.38.
278. See Penn, 438 U.S. at 125.
279. Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271 (2001), aff'd, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
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only very significant down zoning would run into constitutional problems.
Why then do transfer of development rights programs begin with an
assumption of development rights? In attempting to avoid the political
problems associated with land-use regulation, TDR advocates only reinforce
the rights rhetoric that makes the program necessary in the first place.
Some of the more careful considerations of property's triadic nature (i.e.,
"thing," owner, and community) fall back on the rights rhetoric, at least to
some limited extent. For example, Professor Arnold's thorough and useful
critique of the dominant "bundle of rights" metaphor focuses not on criticizing
our understanding of property as predominantly a suite of rights, but rather on
the potential for the Hohfeldian understanding of the rights-duty correlative to
ignore the "thingness" of property.280 Arnold critiques the bundle of rights
metaphor for perpetuating a dyadic understanding of property, but not the
281owner-thing dyad criticized throughout this article. Instead, Arnold's dyad is
between the owner and the duty-obligated community, ignoring the "thing" that
282is the ultimate reason for the relationship. Arnold suggests we would be
better off-better able to take care of, preserve, or protect the land-if we
could think and talk more like the "amateur" property theorist (i.e., the typical
American property owner) who focuses on property as "thing-ownership"
rather than relationship.283
From an ecological perspective, the focus on a "web" of interests, and the
inclusion of the "thing" (e.g., land) within that web, has the effect of turning the
focus from the individual to the consequences of that individual's actions on
her socio-ecological community. This focus on developing an at least triadic
understanding of property as a "web of interests" is therefore warranted, useful,
and consistent with the general thrust of the rhetorical argument presented
herein. But the characterization of the new metaphor as a "web of rights' 284 is
less useful. Again, my critique is not substantive, and I agree with Arnold's
Leopoldian argument that all parts of the property triad have legitimate
interests that must be respected. Arnold's use of "web of interests" as a
metaphor successfully communicates the value of that substantive argument.
But the potential trouble lies in characterizing the new metaphor as "an image
of property that enables us to see the objects of our rights, responsibilities, and
relationships, as well as the shared, interconnected nature of those relationships
280. Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 297; see also Penner, supra note 8, at 714.
281. See supra notes 32-70 and accompanying text.
282. Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 297.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 346, 364. Professor Arnold elsewhere relies on the "web of interests"
metaphor. Id. at 281, 364.
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with regard to objects. '285  This return to a rights-duties approach, and
particularly our cultural difficulty with recognizing that land might itself have
"rights," risks subsuming the value of the "web" metaphor and continuing the
individual-versus-Leviathan understanding of rights that plagues property
rights discourse.
Arnold is not alone in his efforts to re-imagine our property
286conversations. But similar efforts to recast the property rhetoric in a fashion
that might have real effects on the ground also misunderstand the potential
problems with continuing the rights rhetoric. In their "Property Frames"
approach, Professors Nash and Stern address directly the capacity of particular
initial property descriptions to influence a property holder's willingness to
287accept later rights limitations. Nash and Stern present empirical evidence
that "rights perceptions," and specifically the reaction to later "rights
infringement," varies depending on how the property rights were originally
288characterized and understood. The authors conducted experiments
comparing the consequences of two rhetorical options for describing the same
suite of interests: a "discrete-asset" approach that focused on ownership of a
specific thing,289 and a "bundle of rights" approach that described a suite of
rights in the thing.290  Nash and Stem describe the bundle of rights
understanding as originating, in part, as an effort by legal realists "to depict
property as limited, flexible rights capable of ceding to social needs and
obligations., 291  The "discrete-asset" understanding is more similar to the
Blackstonian "sole and despotic dominion' 292 over a single, unified thing,
rather than a combination of disaggregable interests. The discrete-asset
understanding is thus more "absolute" than the bundle of rights understanding.
Nash and Stem determined that when property interests were characterized
as a bundle of rights rather than a discrete asset, the property owner was more
likely to accept subsequent limitations or infringements on those rights,
285. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
286. See generally Nash & Stem, supra note 2; Nash, supra note 2.
287. See generally Nash & Stem, supra note 2; Nash, supra note 2.
288. See Nash & Stem, supra note 2, at 471-79 figs. 1-3.
289. "[T]he student would 'have ownership and control of the laptop and, among
other things, [could] use, possess, and enjoy the laptop, exclude others from using the laptop,
and transfer the laptop."' See Nash & Stem, supra note 2, at 467 (first alteration added).
290. "[S]tudents would 'own a set of rights to the laptop. These rights include, among
other things, the right to use, possess, and enjoy the laptop, the right to exclude others from
using the laptop, and the right to transfer your rights in the laptop. "' Id.
291. Id. at455.
292. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at 2; see also HONORt, supra note 234, at 108
(describing ownership - in one sense - "as the greatest possible interest in a thing which a
mature system of law recognizes").
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particularly where the potential for such infringement was described in
advance.293 This empirical work reinforces the value of a more accurate
description of property interests and relations, even as it retains a "rights"
approach. To be sure, in their "bundle of rights" approach, the word that
matters is "bundle" rather than "right." In this sense, Nash and Stern are most
of the way toward the Hohfeldian "bundle of interests"-and specifically the
bundle of privileges-that would allow for a more complete understanding of
property. But insisting on the use of "rights" to characterize the property
interests retains the individual-versus-Leviathan "frame" for understanding
property.
Returning to Honor6 to close my critique of the academy, we find a final
example of how our property rhetoric unnecessarily detracts from a richer
understanding of property as one component of a larger cultural conversation,
albeit not directly in the "rights" context that has been discussed so far. In this
case, it is Honor6's use of the word "prohibition" rather than "duty" to describe
his ninth property incident.294 Consistent with the individualist's understanding
of property rights as being a bulwark against the Leviathan, characterizing the
obvious and necessary boundaries of our property interests as "prohibitions"
again calls to mind the image of property existing on this boundary between
individual and govemmental power. As Honor6's examples make clear, his
ninth incident identifies those circumstances in which a property owner has
duties that he or she owes to his or her neighbors or community. 295 Of course,
this means that the neighbors, or the community, possess rights relative to that
individual's private property.296  Understanding this relationship from a
Hohfeldian perspective allows again for a focus on how particular interests in
land might affect the community within which those interests arise. But
Honor 's focus is on the individual, refusing to acknowledge that non-owners
can in fact possess rights in their neighbors' property.
The academy exists because our cultural settings have identified it as that
group of particularly specialized or educated individuals best able to identify
and explain truth claims. But if those truth claims are to be accepted as truth in
293. See Nash & Stem, supra note 2, at 471-79.
294. HONORE, supra note 234, at 123.
295. See id. This notion is of course inherent in nuisance actions, which require the
identification of a specific duty on the part of a particular landowner, e.g., the affirmative
duty not to cover your neighbor's house with dust. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257
N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
296. There is a growing literature arguing for a more careful focus on the
responsibilities that accompany ownership of land. This notion is consistent with my
characterization of ownership duties here. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 745, 747-48 (2009);
Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 303-06; FREYFOGLE, supra note 4, at 273.
[Vol. 48:2
PROPERTY RIGHTS
fact, they must provide some legitimate and useful explanatory power to the
cultural settings that requested the truth claims in the first place. There is a
distinction between what the academy identifies as a warranted belief-the
settled belief of a particular group of disciplinary adherents-and what a
community identifies as a valuable belief.297 Only those truth claims that are
valuable for the relevant community-those claims that motivate action-
obtain the blessing of "truth." A property-rights rhetoric within the academy
that is inconsistent with broader cultural understandings of what rights are and
why they exist will never obtain that blessing it seeks: truth.
VI. CONCLUSION: RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND THE
PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORD CHOICE
Clifford Geertz argued that "man is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun. 298  At its most fundamental, law is one
component of that web-the constellation of signs, symbols and meanings that
create culture. Legitimate law must therefore reflect the other aspects of that
culture; ultimately, law requires the blessing of the community or communities
it regulates. A group of cultural actors will-and should-reject legal rhetoric
and the substantive choices that rhetoric recommends that are inconsistent with
the larger suite of their cultural understandings. In the property law context
that matters-the context on the ground-the relevant cultural actors are not
judges, lawyers and academics, but rather the property owners whose interests
the rhetoric seeks to change. In communicating with that group of relevant
cultural and political actors, it does not matter what "we"-as academics,
activists, or judges-understand when we use particular words. What matters
is how our word choices play out in that broader property-related cultural
context, on the ground, where understandings of property have real effects on
our lands and landscapes.
This is not an article about how we understand property. Rather, it is an
article about how the ways in which we talk about property affects the ways our
communities understand property. The argument is simple: talking about
property as if it were something that cannot be regulated by government turns it
297. See, e.g., Robert B. Westbrook, Pragmatism and Democracy: Reconstructing the
Logic of John Dewey's Faith, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL
THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 128, 131 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); WILLIAM JAMES, The
Will to Believe, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 1, 10
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into something that cannot be regulated by government. The reliance on the
word "rights"-with all of its political and cultural meanings-to describe and
understand property limits our capacity to accurately describe both the costs
and benefits of particular interest-allocation decisions. Use of the word
"rights" allows for a narrowed analysis scale that focuses exclusively on the
individual with little concern for that individual's place in a broader
community. That narrowed focus limits the quality of the property that results.
It does not matter whether we begin from a natural rights or social construct
understanding of property, our ultimate goal is to achieve that set of
institutional and property relations that promote the greatest cultural and
societal, and thus individual, good. A rights rhetoric will not achieve that goal.
